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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted great attention as an un-
conditionally secure key distribution scheme. The fundamental feature of
QKD protocols is that the amount of information gained by an eavesdrop-
per, usually referred to as Eve, can be estimated from the channel between
the legitimate sender and the receiver, usually referred to as Alice and Bob
respectively. Such a task cannot be conducted in classical key distribution
schemes. If the estimated amount is lower than a threshold, then Alice and
Bob determine the length of a secret key from the estimated amount of Eve’s
information, and can share a secret key by performing the postprocessing.
One of the most important criteria for the efficiency of the QKD protocols
is the key generation rate, which is the length of securely sharable key per
channel use.
In this thesis, we investigate the channel estimation procedure and the
postprocessing procedure of the QKD protocols in order to improve the
key generation rates of the QKD protocols. Conventionally in the channel
estimation procedure, we only use the statistics of matched measurement
outcomes, which are bit sequences transmitted and received by the same ba-
sis, to estimate the channel; mismatched measurement outcomes, which are
bit sequences transmitted and received by different bases, are discarded in
the conventional estimation procedure. In this thesis, we propose a channel
estimation procedure in which we use the mismatched measurement out-
comes in addition to the matched measurement outcomes. Then, we clarify
that the key generation rates of the QKD protocols with our channel estima-
tion procedure is higher than that with the conventional channel estimation
iii
procedure.
In the conventional postprocessing procedure, which is known as the
advantage distillation, we transmit a message over the public channel re-
dundantly, which is unnecessary divulging of information to Eve. In this
thesis, we propose a postprocessing in which the above mentioned divulging
of information is reduced by using the distributed data compression. We
clarify that the key generation rate of the QKD protocol with our proposed
postprocessing is higher than that with the conventionally known postpro-
cessings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Key distribution is one of the most important and challenging problem in
cryptology. When a sender wants to transmit a confidential message to a
receiver, the sender usually encipher the message by using a secret key that
is only available to the sender and the receiver. For a long time, many
methods have been proposed to solve the key distribution problem. One
of the most broadly used method in the present day is a method whose
security is based on difficulties to solve some mathematical problems, such
as factorization into prime numbers. Such kind of method is believed to
be practically secure, but it has not been proved to be unconditionally
secure; there might exist some clever algorithm to solve those mathematical
problems efficiently. On the other hand, quantum key distribution (QKD),
which is the main theme of this thesis, has attracted the attention of many
researchers, for the reason that its security is based on principles of the
quantum mechanics. In other word, the QKD is secure as long as the
quantum mechanics is correct.
The concept of the quantum cryptography was proposed by Wiesner in
1970s. Unfortunately, his paper was rejected by a journal, and was not pub-
lished until 1983 [Wie83]1. In 1980s, the quantum cryptography was revived
1For more detailed history on the quantum cryptography, see Brassard’s review article
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by Bennett et al. in a series of papers [BBBW82, BB83, BB84b, BB84a].
Especially, the quantum key distribution first appeared in Bennett and
Brassard’s one page proceedings paper [BB83] presented at a conference,
although it is more commonly known as BB84 from its 1984 full publication
[BB84a].
At first, the security of the BB84 protocol was guaranteed only in the
ideal situation such that the channel between the sender and receiver is
noiseless. Later, Bennett et al. proposed modified protocols to handle the
case in which the channel between the sender and the receiver is not neces-
sarily noiseless [BB89, BBB+92]. During the course of their struggle against
the problem, many important concepts such as the information reconcilia-
tion and the privacy amplification, which are explained in detail later, were
proposed [BBR85, BBR88]. Finally , Mayers proposed his version of the
BB84 protocol, and showed its unconditional security [May01] (preliminary
versions of his proof were published in [May95, May96]). Biham et al. also
proposed their version of the BB84 protocol and showed its unconditional
security [BBB+00, BBB+06].
In 2000, Shor an Preskill made a remarkable observation on Mayer’s
security proof of the BB84 protocol [SP00]. They observed that the entan-
glement distillation protocol (EDP) [BBP+96, LC99] with the CSS code,
one of the quantum error correcting codes proposed by Calderbank, Shor,
and Stean [CS96, Ste96], is implicitly used in Mayer’s version of the BB84
protocol, and presented a simple proof of Mayer’s version of the BB84 pro-
tocol. Their proof technique based on the CSS code is further extended
to some directions. For example, Lo [Lo01] proved the security of another
QKD protocol, the six state protocol proposed by Bruß [Bru98], by using
the technique based on the CSS code.
Recently, Renner et al. [RGK05, Ren05, KGR05] developed information
theoretical techniques to prove the security of the QKD protocols includ-
ing the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol2. Their proof method
[Bra05].
2Throughout this thesis, we only treat the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol,
and we mean these two protocols by the QKD protocols.
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provides important insight into the security proof of the QKD protocols.
More precisely, they proved the security of the QKD protocols by extending
the key agreement in the information theory [Mau93, AC93], which will be
explained in the next section, to the context of the QKD protocols.
In this thesis, we employ Renner et al.’s approach for the security proof
of the QKD protocols instead of Shor and Preskill’s approach. Then, we
investigate two important phases, the channel estimation and the postpro-
cessing, of the QKD protocols.
The QKD protocol roughly consists of three phases: the bit transmission
phase, the channel estimation phase, and the postprocessing phase. In the
bit transmission phase, the legitimate sender, usually referred to as Alice
sends a bit sequence to the legitimate receiver, usually referred to as Bob,
by encoding them into quantum carrier (eg. polarizations of photons). The
channel estimation phase will be explained in Section 1.3. In the postpro-
cessing phase, Alice and Bob share a secret key based on their bit sequences
obtained in the bit transmission phase. The postprocessing phase can be es-
sentially regarded as the key agreement problem in the information theory,
which will be explained in the next section.
1.2 Key Agreement in Information Theory
Following Shannon’s mathematical formulation of the cryptography [Sha48]
and the studies on confidential message transmissions over noisy channels
by Wyner [Wyn75] and Csisz´ar and Ko¨rner [CK79], the problem of the key
agreement in the information theory was formulated by Maurer [Mau93],
and was also studied by Ahlswede and Csisz´ar [AC93].
In Maurer’s formulation Alice and Bob have sequences of independently
identically distributed (i.i.d.) correlated binary3 random variables X =
(X1, . . . ,Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) respectively, and the eavesdropper, usu-
ally referred to as Eve, has a sequence of i.i.d. random variables E =
3Actually, the formulation in [Mau93, AC93] is not restricted to binary random vari-
ables. However, we restrict our attention to the binary case because Alice and Bob obtain
binary sequences in the QKD protocols (refer to Section 1.3).
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(E1, . . . , En), which are regarded as the information she obtained by eaves-
dropping X and Y. They conduct a postprocessing4 procedure and share a
secret key by using the pair of bit sequence (X,Y) as a seed.
In the postprocessing procedure, Alice and Bob are allowed to exchange
messages over the authenticated public channel, that is, Eve can know every
message transmitted over this channel but she cannot tamper or forge a
message. Actually, the authenticated public channel can be realized if Alice
and Bob initially share a short secret key [Sti91]5. In the rest of this thesis,
we assume that the public channel is always authenticated though we do
not mention it explicitly.
The communication over the public channel in the postprocessing pro-
cedure may be one-way (from Alice to Bob6) or two-way. The most elemen-
tary postprocessing procedure is a procedure with one-way public commu-
nication, and it consists of two procedures, the information reconciliation
procedure and the privacy amplification procedure.
The purpose of the information reconciliation procedure for Alice and
Bob is to agree on a bit sequence from their correlated bit sequences. This
procedure is nothing but the Slepian-Wolf coding scheme [SW73]7. In this
scheme, Alice sends the compressed version C (say k bit data) of X to
Bob. Then, Bob reproduce Xˆ by using his bit sequence Y and the received
data C. It is well known that Bob can reproduce Alice’s bit sequence with
negligible error probability if Alice sends appropriate k ≃ nH(X|Y ) bits
data.
The purpose of the privacy amplification procedure for Alice and Bob is
to distill secret keys from their bit sequences shared in the information rec-
4The postprocessing is a QKD jargon that means a procedure to distill a secret key
from Alice and Bob’s bit sequences.
5For this reason, it might be more appropriate to call the procedure the key expansion
rather than the key agreement.
6The message transmission can be from Bob to Alice, which case will be treated in
Chapter 3.
7Actually, the procedures proposed in [Mau93, AC93] do not use the Slepian-Wolf
coding scheme. The Slepian-Wolf coding scheme in the context of the key agreement was
first used by Muramatsu [Mur06] explicitly, although it was already used in cryptography
community implicitly (for example in [MW00]).
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onciliation procedure. More specifically, Alice and Bob distill ℓ bits (usually
much shorter than n bit) secret key by using appropriate function from n bit
to ℓ bit. We require the secret keys to be information theoretically secure,
i.e., the distilled key is uniformly distributed and statistically independent
from Eve’s available information C and E.
Since the pair of bit sequences initially shared by Alice and Bob are con-
sidered as a precious resource8, we desire the key generation rate ℓ/n to be
as large as possible. Especially in this paper, we investigate the asymptotic
behavior of the key generation rate, asymptotic key generation rate, such
that the secure key agreement is possible. Roughly speaking9, the secure
key can be distilled if the key generation rate is smaller than Eve’s ambi-
guity (per bit) about the bit sequence after the information reconciliation,
that is,
ℓ
n
<∼ H(X|E) −H(X|Y ). (1.1)
In [Mau93], Maurer also proposed a postprocessing procedure with two-
way public communication. More specifically, he proposed a preprocessing
called advantage distillation that is conducted before the information rec-
onciliation procedure. In the advantage distillation, Alice divides her bit
sequence into blocks of length 2, and sends the parity X2i−1 ⊕X2i of each
block to Bob. Bob also divides his bit sequence into blocks of length 2, and
tells Alice whether the received parity of the ith block coincides with Bob’s
corresponding parity Y2i−1 ⊕ Y2i. If their corresponding parities coincide,
8Actually, Alice and Bob’s initial bit sequences are shared by transmitting photons in
the QKD protocols, and the transmission rate of the photon is usually very slow compared
to the transmission rate of the public channel.
9If Alice conducts a preprocessing before the information reconciliation procedure,
then the condition in Eq. (1.1) can be slightly generalized as
ℓ
n
<
∼ H(U |EV )−H(U |Y V ),
where U and V are auxiliary random variables such that V , U , X, and (Y,E) form a
Markov chain in this order. Although the meaning of the auxiliary random variables have
been unclear for a long time, recently Renner et al. clarified the meaning of U as the noisy
preprocessing in the context of QKD protocol [RGK05] (see also Remark 3.4.6).
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
they keep the second bits of those blocks, which are regarded to have strong
correlation. Otherwise, they discard those blocks, which are regarded to
have weak correlation. Maurer showed that the key generation rate of the
postprocessing with the advantage distillation can be strictly higher than
the right hand side of Eq. (1.1) in an example.
In the context of the QKD protocol, the postprocessing procedure with
both one-way and two-way public communication were considered. Actu-
ally, the postprocessing procedure with one-way public communication were
first studied [May01, SP00]. Later, the postprocessing with the advantage
distillation in the context of QKD protocol was proposed by Gottesman
and Lo [GL03]. The postprocessing with the advantage distillation was
extensively studied by Bae and Ac´ın [BA07].
In Chapter 4, we propose a new kind of postprocessing procedure with
two-way public communication in the context of QKD protocol. The pur-
pose of the advantage distillation was to divide the blocks into highly corre-
lated ones and weakly correlated ones by exchanging the parities. The key
idea of our proposed postprocessing is that the parities in the conventional
advantage distillation is redundantly transmitted over the public channel,
and should be compressed by the Slepian-Wolf coding because Bob’s bits
(Y2i−1, Y2i) is correlated to Alice’s parity X2i−1 ⊕ X2i. In our proposed
postprocessing, Alice does not sends the parities itself, but she sends the
compressed version of the parities by regarding Bob’s sequence Y as the
side-information at the decoder. This enables Alice and Bob to extract a
secret key also from the parity sequence, and improves the key generation
rate. Actually, the key generation rate of the QKD protocols with our pro-
posed postprocessing procedure is as high as that with conventional one-way
or two-way postprocessing procedures. We also clarify that the former is
strictly higher than the latter in some cases.
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1.3 Unique Property of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion
In the previous section, we have explained the mathematical formulation
of the key agreement in the information theory. Then, we have explained
the fact that Alice and Bob have to set the key generation rate according
Eve’s ambiguity about the bit sequence after the information reconciliation
procedure (Eq. (1.1))10 in order to share an information theoretically se-
cure key. However, Alice and Bob cannot calculate the amount of Eve’s
ambiguity about the bit sequence if they do not know the probability distri-
bution PXY E of their initial bit sequence and Eve’s available information.
Therefore, they have to estimate the probability distribution itself, or at
least they have to estimate a lower bound on the quantity H(X|E)11. If
Alice and Bob’s bit sequences (X,Y) are distributed by using a classical
channel, for example the standard telephone line or the Internet, then a
valid estimate will be the trivial one, 0, because Eve can eavesdrop as much
as she want without being detected. The QKD protocols provide a way to
estimate a non-trivial lower bound on H(X|E) by using the axioms of the
quantum mechanics.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice randomly chooses a bit sequence and send
it by encoding each bit into a polarization of a photon. When she encodes
each bit into a polarization of a photon, she chooses one of two encoding
rules at random. In the first encoding rule, she encodes 0 into the vertical
polarization, and 1 into the horizontal polarization. In the second encoding
rule, she encodes 0 into the 45 degree polarization, and 1 into the 135 degree
polarization.
On the other hand, Bob measures the received photons by using one
of two measurement device at random. The first measurement device dis-
10When Alice and Bob conduct the postprocessing with two-way public communication,
they have to set the key generation rate according to more complicated formula (for more
detail, see Chapter 4).
11Since the quantity H(X|Y ) only involves the marginal distribution PXY , Alice and
Bob can easily estimate it by sacrificing a part of their bit sequence as samples. Therefore,
we restrict our attention to the quantity H(X|E).
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criminate between the vertical and the horizontal polarizations, and the
measurement outcome is decoded into the corresponding bit value. The
second measurement device discriminate between the 45 degree and the 135
degree polarizations, and the measurement outcome is decoded into the
corresponding bit value.
After the reception of the photons, Alice and Bob announce over the
public channel which encoding rule and which measurement device they
have used for each bit. Then, they keep those bits if their encoding rule and
measurement device are compatible, i.e., Alice uses the first (the second)
encoding rule and Bob uses the first (the second) measurement device. We
call such bit sequences the matched measurement outcomes. On the other
hand, they discard those bits if their encoding rule and measurement de-
vice are incompatible, i.e., Alice uses the first (the second) encoding rule
and Bob uses the second (the first) measurement device. We call such bit
sequences the mismatched measurement outcomes. Furthermore, Alice and
Bob announce a part of their matched measurement outcomes to estimate
candidates of the quantum channel over which the photons were transmit-
ted. The rest of the matched measurement outcomes are used as a seed for
sharing a secret key.
The most important feature of the QKD protocols is that we can calcu-
late the quantityH(X|E)12 by using the axioms of the quantummechanics if
they know the quantum channel exactly. Therefore, we can estimate a lower
bound on H(X|E) via estimating the candidates of the quantum channel.
Actually, we employ the quantity H(X|E) minimized over the estimated
candidates of the quantum channel as an estimate of true H(X|E).
As we explained above, in the conventional BB84 protocol we discard
the mismatched measurement outcomes and we estimate the candidates of
the quantum channel by using only the samples from the matched mea-
surement outcomes. In Chapter 3, we propose a channel estimation proce-
dure in which we use the mismatched measurement outcomes in addition
12It should be noted that we have to use the conditional von Neumann entropy instead
of the conditional Shannon entropy in the case of the QKD protocols (for more detail, see
Chapter 3).
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to the samples from the matched measurement outcomes. The use of the
mismatched measurement outcomes enables us to reduce candidates of the
quantum channel, and then enables us to estimate tighter lower bounds on
the quantity H(X|E). Actually, we clarify that the key generation rate
decided according to our proposed channel estimation procedure is at least
as high as the key generation rate decided according to the conventional
channel estimation procedure. We also clarify that the former is strictly
higher than the latter in some cases. In Chapter 4, we also apply our
proposed channel estimation procedure to the protocol with the two-way
postprocessing proposed in Chapter 4.
It should be noted that the use of the mismatched measurement out-
comes was already considered in literatures. In early 90s, Barnett et al. [BHP93]
showed that the use of mismatched measurement outcomes enables Alice
and Bob to detect the presence of Eve with higher probability for the so-
called intercept and resend attack. Furthermore, some literatures use the
mismatched measurement outcomes to ensure the quantum channel to be a
Pauli channel [BCE+03, LKE+03, KLO+05, KLKE05], where a Pauli chan-
nel is a channel over which four kinds of Pauli errors (including the identity)
occur probabilistically. However the quantum channel is not necessarily a
Pauli channel in general. One of the aims of this thesis is to convince the
readers that the non-Pauli channels deserve consideration in the research of
the QKD protocols as well as the Pauli channel.
1.4 Summary
The QKD protocols consists of three phases: the bit transmission phase,
the channel estimation phase, and the postprocessing phase. The role of
the channel estimation phase is to estimate the amount of Eve’s ambiguity
about the bit sequence transmitted in the bit transmission phase. According
to the estimated amount of Eve’s ambiguity, we decide the key generation
rate and conduct the postprocessing to share a secret key.
In the conventional estimation procedure, we do not use the mismatched
measurement outcomes. By using the mismatched measurement outcomes
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in addition to the samples from the matched measurement outcomes, we
can improve the key generation rate of the QKD protocols. This topic is
investigated in Chapter 3.
In the conventional (two-way) postprocessing procedure, we transmit
a message over the public channel redundantly, which is unnecessary di-
vulging of information to Eve. By transmitting the compressed version of
the redundantly transmitted message, we can improve the key generation
rate of the QKD protocols. This topic is investigated in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce some terminologies and notations, and give
a brief review of the known results that are used throughout this thesis.
The first section is devoted to a review of the classical information theory
[CT06] and the quantum information theory [NC00, Hay06]. In the second
section, we review the known results on the privacy amplification, which is
the most important tool for the security of the QKD protocols.
2.1 Elements of Classical and Quantum Informa-
tion Theory
2.1.1 Probability Distribution and Density Operator
For a finite set X , let P(X ) be the set of all probability distributions P
on X , i.e., P (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and ∑x∈X P (x) = 1. For a sequence
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, the type of x is the empirical probability distribution
Px ∈ P(X ) defined by
Px(a) :=
|{i | xi = a}|
n
for a ∈ X ,
where |A| is the cardinality of a set A.
For a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H, let P(H) be the set of all
11
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density operators ρ on H, i.e., ρ is non-negative and normalized, Trρ = 1.
Mathematically, a state of a quantum mechanical system with d-degree
of freedom is represented by a density operator on H with dimH = d.
Throughout the thesis, we occasionally call ρ a state and H a system. For
Hilbert spaces HA and HB , the set of all density operators P(HA ⊗ HB)
on the tensor product space HA ⊗ HB is defined in a similar manner. In
Section 2.2, we occasionally treat non-normalized non-negative operators.
For this reason, we denote the set of all non-negative operators on a system
H (and a composite system HA ⊗HB) by P ′(H) (and P ′(HA ⊗HB)).
The classical random variables can be regarded as a special case of the
quantum states. For a random variable X with a distribution PX ∈ P(X ),
let
ρX :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x|,
where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of HX . We call ρX the operator
representation of the classical distribution PX .
When a quantum system HA is prepared in a state ρxA according to a
realization x of a random variable X with a probability distribution PX , it
is convenient to describe this situation by a density operator
ρXA :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxA ∈ P(HX ⊗HA), (2.1)
where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of HX . We call the density operator
ρXA a {cq}-state [DW05], or we say ρXA is classical on HX with respect
to the orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X . We call ρxA a conditional operator.
When a quantum system HA is prepared in a state ρx,yA according to a
joint random variable (X,Y ) with a probability distribution PXY , a state
ρXY A is defined in a similar manner, and the state ρXY A is called a {ccq}-
state. For non-normalized operator ρXA ∈ P ′(HX ⊗ HA), if we can write
ρXA as in Eq. (2.1), we say that ρXA is classical on HX with respect to
the orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X . However, it should be noted that the
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distribution PX or conditional operators ρ
x
A are not necessarily normalized
for a non-normalized ρXA.
For a {cq}-state ρXA ∈ P(HX ⊗HA), we occasionally consider a density
operator such that the classical system HX is mapped by a function f :
X → Y. By setting the distribution
PY (y) =
∑
x∈X
f(x)=y
PX(x)
and the density operator
ρyA =
∑
x∈X
f(x)=y
PX(x)ρ
x
A/PY (y),
we can describe the resulting {cq}-state as
ρY E :=
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyA. (2.2)
In the quantum mechanics, the most general measurement is described
by the positive operator valued measure (POVM). A POVM for a system H
consists of the set A of measurement outcomes, and the set M = {Ma}a∈A
of positive operators indexed by the set A. For a state ρ ∈ P(H), the
probability distribution of the measurement outcomes is given by
P (a) = Tr[ρMa].
In the quantum mechanics, the most general state evolution of a quan-
tum mechanical system is described by a completely positive (CP) map. It
can be shown that any CP map E can be written as
E(ρ) =
∑
a∈A
EaρE
∗
a (2.3)
for a family of linear operators {Ea}a∈A from the initial system H to the
destination system H′, whereA is the index set. We usually require the map
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to be trace preserving (TP), i.e.,
∑
a∈A E
∗
aEa = idH, but if a state evolution
involves a selection of states by a measurement, then the corresponding CP
map is not necessarily trace preserving, i.e.,
∑
a∈AE
∗
aEa ≤ idH.
2.1.2 Distance and Fidelity
In this thesis, we use two kinds of distances. One is the variational distance
of P(X ). For non-negative functions P,P ′ ∈ P(X ), the variational distance
between P and P ′ is defined by
‖P − P ′‖ :=
∑
x∈X
|P (x)− P ′(x)|.
The other distance used in this paper is the trace distance of P ′(H). For
non-negative operators ρ, σ ∈ P ′(H), the trace distance between ρ and σ is
defined by
‖ρ− σ‖ := Tr|ρ− σ|,
where |A| := √A∗A for a operator onH, and A∗ is the adjoint operator of A.
The following lemma states that the trace distance between (not necessarily
normalized operators) does not increase by applying a CP map, and it is
used several times in this paper.
Lemma 2.1.1 [Ren05, Lemma A.2.1] Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P ′(H) and let E be a
trace-non-increasing CP map, i.e., E satisfies TrE(σ) ≤ Trσ for any σ ∈
P ′(H). Then we have
‖E(ρ)− E(ρ′)‖ ≤ ‖ρ− ρ′‖.
The following lemma states that, for a {cq}-state ρXB , if two classical
messages v and v¯ are computed from x and they are equal with high proba-
bility, then the {ccq} state ρXV B and ρXV¯ B that involve computed classical
messages v and v¯ are close with respect to the trace distance.
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Lemma 2.1.2 Let
ρXB :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB
be a {cq}-state, and let V := f(X) for a function f and V¯ := g(X) for a
function g. Assume that
Pr{V 6= V } =
∑
x∈X
f(x) 6=g(x)
PX(x) ≤ ε.
Then, for {ccq}-states
ρXV B :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |f(x)〉〈f(x)| ⊗ ρxB
and
ρXV B :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |g(x)〉〈g(x)| ⊗ ρxB ,
we have
‖ρXV B − ρXV B‖ ≤ 2ε.
Proof. We have
‖ρXV B − ρXV B‖
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)‖|x〉〈x|‖ · ‖|f(x)〉〈f(x)| − |g(x)〉〈g(x)|‖ · ‖ρxB‖
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · 2(1− δf(x),g(x))
≤ 2ε,
where δa,b = 1 if a = b and δa,b = 0 if a 6= b. 
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The fidelity between two (not necessarily normalized) operators ρ, σ ∈
P ′(H) is defined by
F (ρ, σ) := Tr
√√
ρσ
√
ρ.
The following lemma is an extension of Uhlmann’s theorem to non-normalized
operators ρ and σ.
Lemma 2.1.3 [Ren05, Theorem A.1.2] Let ρ, σ ∈ P ′(H), and let |ψ〉 ∈
HR ⊗H be a purification of ρ. Then
F (ρ, σ) = max
|φ〉〈φ|
F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |φ〉〈φ|),
where the maximum is taken over all purifications |φ〉 ∈ HR ⊗H of σ.
The trace distance and the fidelity have close relationship. If the trace
distance between two non-negative operators ρ and σ is close to 0, then the
fidelity between ρ and σ is close to 1, and vise versa.
Lemma 2.1.4 [Ren05, Lemma A.2.4] Let ρ, σ ∈ P ′(H). Then, we have
‖ρ− σ‖ ≤
√
(Trρ+Trσ)2 − 4F (ρ, σ)2.
Lemma 2.1.5 [Ren05, Lemma A.2.6] Let ρ, σ ∈ P ′(H). Then, we have
Trρ+Trσ − 2F (ρ, σ) ≤ ‖ρ− σ‖.
2.1.3 Entropy and its Related Quantities
For a random variable X on X with a probability distribution PX ∈ P(X ),
the entropy of X is defined by
H(X) = H(PX) := −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) log PX(x),
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where we assume the base of log is 2 throughout the thesis. Especially for
a real number 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the binary entropy function is defined by
h(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p).
Similarly, for a joint random variables X and Y with a joint probability
distribution PXY ∈ P(X × Y), the joint entropy of X and Y is
H(XY ) = H(PXY )
:= −
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x, y) log PXY (x, y).
The conditional entropy of X given Y is defined by
H(X|Y ) := H(XY )−H(Y ).
The mutual information between the joint random variables X and Y is
defined by
I(X;Y ) := H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY ).
For a quantum state ρ ∈ P(H), the von Neumann entropy of the system
is defined by
H(ρ) := −Trρ log ρ.
For a quantum state ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) of the composite system, the von
Neumann entropy of the composite system is H(ρAB). The conditional von
Neaumann entropy of the system A given the system B is defined by
Hρ(A|B) := H(ρAB)−H(ρB),
where ρB = TrA[ρAB ] is the partial trace of ρAB over the system A. The
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quantum mutual information between the system A and B is defined by
Iρ(A;B) := H(ρA) +H(ρB)−H(ρAB).
It should be noted that, for {cq}-state ρXA, the quantum mutual informa-
tion coincides with the Holevo information, i.e.,
Iρ(X;A) = H(ρA)−
∑
x∈X
PX(x)H(ρ
x
A).
Remark 2.1.6 In this paper, we denote ρA for TrB [ρAB ] or ρB for TrAC [ρABC ]
e.t.c. without declaring them if they are obvious from the context.
2.1.4 Bloch Sphere, Choi Operator, and Stokes Parameter-
ization
In this section, we first introduce the Bloch sphere, which is a parameteriza-
tion of the set P(H) of density operators on two-dimensional space (qubit).
Then, we introduce the Choi operator for the qubit channel and its Stokes
parameterization.
Let
σx :=
[
0 1
1 0
]
, σy :=
[
0 −i
i 0
]
, σz :=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
be the Pauli operators, and let σi = I be the identity operator on the qubit.
Then, the set {σi, σx, σy, σz} form a basis of the set L(H) of all operators on
H. Furthermore, we have
P(H) =
{
1
2
[
1 + θz θx − iθy
θx + iθy 1− θz
]
: θ2x + θ
2
y + θ
2
z ≤ 1
}
, (2.4)
that is, there is one-to-one correspondence between a qubit density opera-
tor and a (column) vector1 θ = [θz, θx, θy]
T within the unit sphere, which is
called the Bloch sphere [NC00]. By a straightforward calculation, we can
1For a reason clarified in Section 3.6, we denote the coordinate in this order.
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find that the von Neumann entropy of the density operator ρ that corre-
sponds to the vector θ = [θz, θx, θy]
T is
H(ρ) = h
(
1 + ‖θ‖
2
)
, (2.5)
where ‖θ‖ is the Euclidian norm of the vector θ.
Let W(HA,HB) be the set of all TPCP maps (see Section 2.1.1) from
P(HA) to P(HB), where we set HA = HB as qubit. Let
|ψ〉 := |00〉+ |11〉√
2
(2.6)
be a maximally entangled state on the composite system HA ⊗HB. Then,
we define the set Pc ⊂ P(HA ⊗ HB) such as any element ρ ∈ Pc satisfies
TrB[ρ] = I/2. It is well known that [Cho75, FA99] there is one-to-one
correspondence between the set W(HA,HB) and the set Pc via the map
W(HA,HB) ∋ E 7→ ρAB := (id⊗ E)(ψ) ∈ Pc.
The operator ρAB is also known as the (normalized) Choi operator [Cho75].
For a Choi operator ρAB ∈ Pc, let
Rba := Tr[ρAB(σ¯a ⊗ σb)] (2.7)
and
tb := Tr[ρAB(I ⊗ σb)] (2.8)
for a, b ∈ {z, x, y}, where σ¯a is the complex conjugate of σa. The pair
(R, t) :=




Rzz Rzx Rzy
Rxz Rxx Rxy
Ryz Ryx Ryy

 ,


tz
tx
ty




of the matrix and the vector is called the Stokes parameterization of the
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channel E and the Choi operator ρAB [FN98, FA99]. By a straightforward
calculation, we can find that the channel E is equivalent to the affine map


θz
θx
θy

 7→


Rzz Rzx Rzy
Rxz Rxx Rxy
Ryz Ryx Ryy




θz
θx
θy

+


tz
tx
ty


from the Bloch sphere to itself.
In the rest of this thesis, we identify a Choi operator and its Stokes
parameterization if it is obvious from the context. For example, (R, t) ∈ A ⊂
Pc means that the Choi operator ρAB corresponding to (R, t) is included in
the subset A.
2.2 Privacy Amplification
In this section, we review the privacy amplification. First, we review notions
of the (smooth) min-entropy and the (smooth) max-entropy. The (smooth)
min-entropy and the (smooth) max-entropy are useful tool to prove the
security of QKD protocols [KGR05, RGK05, Ren05]. Especially, (smooth)
min-entropy is much more important, because it is related to the length
of the securely distillable key by the privacy amplification. The privacy
amplification [BBR85, BBR88, BBCM95] is a technique to distill a secret
key from partially secret data, on which an adversary might have some
information. Later, the privacy amplification was extended to the case that
an adversary have information encoded into a state of a quantum system
[CRE04, KMR05, RK05, Ren05]. Most of the following results can be found
in [Ren05, Sections 3 and 5], but lemmas without citations are additionally
proved in the appendix of [WMUK07]. We need Lemma 2.2.8 to apply the
results in [Ren05] to the QKD protocols with two-way postprocessing in
Chapter 4. More specifically, Eq. (3.22) in [Ren05, Theorem 3.2.12] plays
an important role to show a statement similar as Corollary 2.2.9 in the case
of the QKD protocols with one-way postprocessing. However, the condition
of Eq. (3.22) in [Ren05, Theorem 3.2.12] is too restricted, and cannot be
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applied to the case of the two-way postprocessing proposed in Chapter 4.
Thus, we show Corollary 2.2.9 via Lemma 2.2.8. Lemmas 2.2.5 and 2.2.7
are needed to prove Lemma 2.2.8.
2.2.1 Min- and Max- Entropy
The (smooth) min-entropy and (smooth) max-entropy are formally defined
as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 [Ren05, Definition 3.1.1] Let ρAB ∈ P ′(HA ⊗ HB) and
σB ∈ P(HB). The min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is defined by
Hmin(ρAB|σB) := − log λ,
where λ is the minimum real number such that λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB ≥ 0,
where idA is the identity operator on HA. When the condition supp(ρB) ⊂
supp(σB) does not hold, there is no λ satisfying the condition λ · idA⊗σB−
ρAB ≥ 0, thus we define Hmin(ρAB|σB) := −∞.
The max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is defined by
Hmax(ρAB |σB) := log Tr
(
(idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
)
,
where ρ0AB denotes the projector onto the support of ρAB .
The min-entropy and the max-entropy of ρAB given HB are defined by
Hmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hmin(ρAB |σB)
Hmax(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hmax(ρAB |σB),
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB).
When HB is the trivial space C, the min-entropy and the max-entropy
of ρA is
Hmin(ρA) = − log λmax(ρA)
Hmax(ρA) = log rank(ρA),
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where λmax(·) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the argument.
Definition 2.2.2 [Ren05, Definitions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2] Let ρAB ∈ P ′(HA ⊗
HB), σB ∈ P(HB), and ε ≥ 0. The ε-smooth min-entropy and the ε-smooth
max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB are defined by
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) := sup
ρAB
Hmin(ρAB |σB)
Hεmax(ρAB |σB) := inf
ρAB
Hmax(ρAB|σB),
where the supremum and infimum ranges over the set Bε(ρAB) of all oper-
ators ρAB ∈ P ′(HA ⊗HB) such that ‖ρAB − ρAB‖ ≤ (TrρAB)ε.
The conditional ε-smooth min-entropy and the ε-smooth max-entropy
of ρAB given HB are defined by
Hεmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hεmin(ρAB |σB)
Hεmax(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hεmax(ρAB |σB),
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB).
The following lemma is a kind of chain rule for the smooth min-entropy.
Lemma 2.2.3 [Ren05, Theorem 3.2.12] For a tripartite operator ρABC ∈
P ′(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), we have
Hεmin(ρABC |C) ≤ Hεmin(ρABC |BC) +Hmax(ρB). (2.9)
The following lemma states that removing the classical system only de-
creases the min-entropy.
Lemma 2.2.4 [Ren05, Lemma 3.1.9] (monotonicity of min-entropy) Let
ρXBC ∈ P ′(HX ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) be classical on HX , and let σC ∈ P(HC).
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Then, we have
Hmin(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρBC |σC).
In order to extend Lemma 2.2.4 to the smooth min-entropy, we need Lem-
mas 2.2.5 and 2.2.7.
Lemma 2.2.5 Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) be a density operator. For ε ≥ 0,
let ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB). Then, there exists a operator ρˆAB ∈ Bε¯(ρAB) such that
TrA[ρˆAB] = ρˆB , where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. Since ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB), we have
‖ρˆB‖ ≥ ‖ρB‖ − ‖ρB − ρˆB‖ ≥ 1− ε.
Then, from Lemma 2.1.5, we have
F (ρB , ρˆB) ≥ 1
2
(TrρB +TrρˆB − ‖ρB − ρˆB‖)
≥ 1− ε.
Let |Ψ〉 ∈ HR ⊗ HA ⊗ HB be a purification of ρAB. Then, from Theorem
2.1.3, there exists a purification |Φ〉 ∈ HR ⊗HA ⊗HB of ρˆB such that
F (|Ψ〉, |Φ〉) = F (ρB , ρˆB) ≥ 1− ε.
By noting that F (|Ψ〉, |Φ〉)2 ≥ 1− 2ε, from Lemma 2.1.4, we have
‖|Ψ〉〈Ψ| − |Φ〉〈Φ|‖ ≤
√
8ε.
Let ρˆAB := TrR[|Φ〉〈Φ|]. Then, since the trace distance does not increase
by the partial trace, we have
‖ρAB − ρˆAB‖ ≤
√
8ε.

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Remark 2.2.6 In Lemma 2.2.5, if the density operator ρAB is classical
with respect to both systems HA ⊗HB, then we can easily replace ε¯ by ε.
Then, ε¯ in Lemma 2.2.7, 2.2.8 and Corollary 2.2.9 can also be replaced by
ε.
Lemma 2.2.7 Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗HB) be a density operator that is clas-
sical on HX . For ε ≥ 0, let ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB). Then, there exists a operator
ρˆXB ∈ Bε¯(ρXB) such that TrX [ρˆXB ] = ρˆB and ρˆXB is classical on HX ,
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. From Lemma 2.2.5, there exists a operator ρ′XB ∈ Bε¯(ρXB) such
that TrX [ρ
′
XB ] = ρˆB . Let EX be a projection measurement CP map on HX ,
i.e.,
EX(ρ) :=
∑
x∈X
|x〉〈x|ρ|x〉〈x|,
where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis ofHX . Let ρˆXB := (EX⊗idB)(ρ′XB).
Then, since the trace distance does not increase by the CP map, and
(EX ⊗ idB)(ρXB) = ρXB , we have
‖ρˆXB − ρXB‖
= ‖(EX ⊗ idB)(ρ′XB)− (EX ⊗ idB)(ρXB)‖
≤ ‖ρ′XB − ρXB‖
≤ ε¯,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.1.1. Furthermore, we have
TrX [ρˆXB ] = TrX [ρ
′
XB ] = ρˆB , and ρˆXB is classical on HX . 
The following lemma states that the monotonicity of the min-entropy
(Lemma 2.2.4) can be extended to the smooth min-entropy by adjusting the
smoothness ε.
Lemma 2.2.8 Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX ⊗HB ⊗HC) be a density operator that
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is classical on HX . Then, for any ε ≥ 0, we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |C) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |C),
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. We will prove that
H ε¯min(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)
holds for any σC ∈ P(HC). From the definition of the smooth min-entropy,
for any ν > 0, there exists ρˆBC ∈ Bε(ρBC) such that
Hmin(ρˆBC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)− ν. (2.10)
From Lemma 2.2.7, there exists a operator ρˆXBC ∈ Bε¯(ρXBC ) such that
TrX [ρˆXBC ] = ρˆBC , and ρˆXBC is classical on HX . Then, from Lemma 2.2.4,
we have
Hmin(ρˆXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆBC |σC). (2.11)
Furthermore, from the definition of smooth min-entropy, we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆXBC |σC). (2.12)
Since ν > 0 is arbitrary, combining Eqs. (2.10)–(2.12), we have the assertion
of the lemma. 
Combining Eq. (2.9) of Lemma 2.2.3 and Lemma 2.2.8, we have the
following corollary, which states that the condition decreases the smooth
min-entropy by at most the amount of the max-entropy of the condition,
and plays an important role to prove the security of the QKD protocols.
Corollary 2.2.9 Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) be a density operator
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that is classical on HX . Then, for any ε ≥ 0, we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |XC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |C)−Hmax(ρX),
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
For a product {cq}-state ρ⊗nXB, the smooth min-entropy can be evaluated
by using the von Neumann entropy.
Lemma 2.2.10 [Ren05, Corollary 3.3.7]2 Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be a
density operator which is classical on HX . Then for ε ≥ 0, we have
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
XB |Bn) ≥ H(ρXB)−H(ρB)− δ,
where δ := (2Hmax(ρX) + 3)
√
log(2/ε)
n .
2.2.2 Privacy Amplification
The following definition is used to state the security of the distilled key by
the privacy amplification.
Definition 2.2.11 [Ren05, Definition 5.2.1] Let ρAB ∈ P ′(HA⊗HB). Then
the trace distance from the uniform of ρAB given B is defined by
d(ρAB |B) := ‖ρAB − ρmixA ⊗ ρB‖,
where ρmixA :=
1
dimHA
idA is the fully mixed state onHA and ρB := TrA[ρAB ].
Definition 2.2.12 [CW79] Let F be a set of functions from X to S, and
let PF be the uniform probability distribution on F . The set F is called
universal hash family if Pr{f(x) = f(x′)} ≤ 1|Z| for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X .
Consider an operator ρXE ∈ P ′(HX ⊗HE) that is classical with respect
to an orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX , and assume that f is a function
2See also Ref. [22] of [SR08]
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from X to S. The operator describing the classical function output together
with the quantum system HE is then given by
ρf(X)E :=
∑
s∈S
|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE for ρsE :=
∑
x∈f−1(z)
ρxE , (2.13)
where {|s〉}s∈S is an orthonormal basis of HS.
Assume now that the function f is randomly chosen from a set F of
function according to the uniform probability distribution PF . Then the
output f(x), the state of the quantum system, and the choice of the function
f is described by the operator
ρF (X)EF :=
∑
f∈F
PF (f)ρf(X)E ⊗ |f〉〈f | (2.14)
on HS ⊗ HE ⊗ HF , where HF is a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis
{|f〉}f∈F . The system HS describes the distilled key, and the system HE
and HF describe the information which an adversary Eve can access. The
following lemma states that the length of securely distillable key is given by
the conditional smooth min-entropy Hεmin(ρXE |E).
Lemma 2.2.13 [Ren05, Corollary 5.6.1] Let ρXE ∈ P(HX ⊗ HE) be a
density operator which is classical with respect to an orthonormal basis
{|x〉}x∈X of HX . Let F be a universal hash family of functions from X to
{0, 1}ℓ, and let ε > 0. Then we have
d(ρF (X)EF |EF ) ≤ 2ε+ 2−
1
2
(Hεmin(ρXE |E)−ℓ)
for ρF (X)EF ∈ P(HS ⊗HE ⊗HF ) defined by Eq. (2.14).
By using Corollary 2.2.9 and Lemma 2.2.13, we can derive the following
corollary, which gives the length of the securely distillable key when Eve
can access classical information in addition to the quantum information.
Corollary 2.2.14 Let ρXCE be a density operator on P(HX ⊗HC ⊗HE)
that is classical with respect to the systems X and C. Let F be a universal
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family of hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ, and let ε > 0. If
ℓ < H ε¯min(ρXE |E)− log dimHC − 2 log(1/ε),
then we have
d(ρF (X)CEF |CEF ) ≤ 3ε,
where ε¯ = ε2/8.
Remark 2.2.15 When the density operator ρXCE is such that the system
C only depends on X, then ε¯ in Corollary 2.2.14 can be replaced by ε
[Ren05, Lemma 6.4.1].
Chapter 3
Channel Estimation
3.1 Background
As we have mentioned in Chapter 1, the QKD protocols consists of three
phases: the bit transmission phase, the channel estimation phase, and the
postprocessing phases. The postprocessing is a procedure in which Alice
and Bob generate a secret key from their bit sequences obtained in the bit
transmission phase, and the key generation rate (the length of the generated
key divided by the length of their initial bit sequences) is decided according
to the amount of Eve’s ambiguity about their bit sequence estimated in the
channel estimation phase. The channel estimation phase is the main topic
investigated in this chapter.
Mathematically, quantum channels are described by trace preserving
completely positive (TPCP) maps [NC00]. Conventionally in the QKD pro-
tocols, we only use the statistics of matched measurement outcomes, which
are transmitted and received by the same basis, to estimate the TPCP
map describing the quantum channel; mismatched measurement outcomes,
which are transmitted and received by different bases, are discarded in the
conventionally used channel estimation methods. By using the statistics of
mismatched measurement outcomes in addition to that of matched mea-
surement outcomes, we can estimate the TPCP map more accurately than
the conventional estimation method. Such an accurate channel estimation
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method is also known as the quantum tomography [CN97, PCZ97]. In
early 90s, Barnett et al. [BHP93] showed that the use of mismatched mea-
surement outcomes enables Alice and Bob to detect the presence of Eve
with higher probability for the so-called intercept and resend attack. Fur-
thermore, some literatures use the accurate estimation method to ensure
the channel to be a Pauli channel [BCE+03, LKE+03, KLO+05, KLKE05],
where a Pauli channel is a channel over which four kinds of Pauli errors
(including the identity) occur probabilistically. However the channel is not
necessarily a Pauli channel.
The use of the accurate channel estimation method has a potential to
improve the key generation rates of the QKD protocols. For this purpose, we
have to construct a postprocessing that fully utilize the accurate channel es-
timation results. However, there was no proposed practically implementable
postprocessing that can fully utilizes the accurate estimation method. Re-
cently, Renner et al. [RGK05, Ren05, KGR05] developed information theo-
retical techniques to prove the security of the QKD protocols. Their proof
techniques can be used to prove the security of the QKD protocols with a
postprocessing that fully utilizes the accurate estimation method. However
they only considered Pauli channels or partial twirled channels1. For Pauli
channels, the accurate estimation method and the conventional estimation
method make no difference.
In this chapter, we propose a channel estimation procedure in which
we use the mismatched measurement outcomes in addition to the matched
measurement outcomes, and also propose a postprocessing that fully utilize
our channel estimation procedure. We use the Slepian-Wolf coding [SW73]
with the linear code (linear Slepian-Wolf coding) in our information recon-
ciliation (IR) procedure.
The use of the linear Slepian-Wolf coding in the IR procedure has the fol-
lowing advantage over the IR procedures in the literatures [RGK05, Ren05,
KGR05, DW05]. In [DW05], the authors constructed their IR procedure
by the so-called random coding method. Therefore, their IR procedure is
1By the partial twirling (discrete twirling) [BDSW96], any channel becomes a Pauli
channel.
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not practically implementable. In [RGK05, Ren05, KGR05], the authors
constructed their IR procedure by randomly choosing an encoder from a
universal hash family2. Their IR procedure is essentially equivalent to the
Slepian-Wolf coding. However, the ensemble the encoder of the low density
parity check (LDPC) code, which is one of the practical linear codes, is
not a universal hash family. On the other hand, the linear code in our IR
procedure can be a LDPC code.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we ex-
plain the bit transmission phase of the QKD protocols with some technical
terminologies. Then, we formally describe the problem setting of the QKD
protocols. In Section 3.3, we show our IR procedure. In Section 3.4.1,
we show our proposed channel estimation procedure, and then clarify a
sufficient condition such that Alice and Bob can share a secure key (Theo-
rem 3.4.3). Then, we derive the asymptotic key generation rate formulae.
In Section 3.5, we clarify the relation between our proposed channel esti-
mation procedure and the conventional channel estimation procedure. In
Section 3.6, we investigate the asymptotic key generation rates for some
representative examples of channels.
It should be noted that most of the results in this chapter first appeared
in [WMU08]. However, some of the results in Section 3.6.1 and Section 3.7
are newly obtained in this thesis.
3.2 BB84 and Six-State Protocol
In the six-state protocol, Alice randomly sends bit 0 or 1 to Bob by modu-
lating it into a transmission basis that is randomly chosen from the z-basis
{|0z〉, |1z〉}, the x-basis {|0x〉, |1x〉}, or the y-basis {|0y〉, |1y〉}, where |0a〉, |1a〉
are eigenstates of the Pauli operator σa for a ∈ {x, y, z} respectively. Then
Bob randomly chooses one of measurement observables σx, σy, and σz, and
converts a measurement result +1 or −1 into a bit 0 or 1 respectively. After
a sufficient number of transmissions, Alice and Bob publicly announce their
2See Definition 2.2.12 for the definition of the universal hash family.
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transmission bases and measurement observables. They also announce a
part of their bit sequences as sample bit sequences for estimating channel
between Alice and Bob.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice only uses z-basis and x-basis to transmit
the bit sequence, and Bob only uses observables σz and σx to receive the bit
sequence.
For simplicity we assume that Eve’s attack is the collective attack, i.e.,
the channel connecting Alice and Bob is given by tensor products of a chan-
nel EB from a qubit density operator to itself. This assumption is not a
restriction for Eve’s attack by the following reason. Suppose that Alice and
Bob perform a random permutation to their bit sequence. By perform-
ing this random permutation, the channel between Alice and Bob becomes
permutation invariant. Then, we can asymptotically reduce the security of
the QKD protocols for the most general attack, the coherent attack, to the
security of the collective attack by using the (quantum) de Finetti represen-
tation theorem [Ren05, Ren07, CKR09]. Roughly speaking, the de Finetti
representation theorem says that (randomly permuted) general attack can
be approximated by a convex mixture of collective attacks.
So far we have explained the so-called prepare and measure scheme of
the QKD protocols. There is the so-called entanglement based scheme of the
QKD protocols [Eke91]. In the entanglement based scheme, Alice prepares
the Bell state
|ψ〉 = |00〉 + |11〉√
2
,
and sends the second system to Bob over the quantum channel EB . Then,
Alice and Bob conduct measurements for the shared state
ρAB := (id⊗ EB)(ψ)
by using randomly chosen observables σa and σb respectively. Although the
entangled based scheme is essentially equivalent to the prepare and measure
scheme [BBM92], the latter is more practical in the present day technology
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because Alice and Bob do not need the quantum memory to store qubits.
However, the former is more convenient to mathematically treat the BB84
protocol and the six-state protocol in a unified manner. Therefore in the
rest of this thesis, we employ the entanglement based scheme of the QKD
protocols, and consider the following situation.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share the bipartite (qubits) system (HA ⊗
HB)⊗N whose state is ρ⊗NAB . Alice and Bob conduct measurements for the
first n (out of N) bipartite systems by z-basis respectively3. They also
conduct measurements for the latter m (out of N) bipartite systems by
randomly chosen bases from the set Jb := {x, z} in the BB84 protocol and
Js := {x, z, y} in the six-state protocol. Formally, the measurement for the
latter m systems can be described by the bipartite POVM M := {Mz}z∈Z
on the bipartite system HA⊗HB, where Z := F2×Jb×F2×Jb for the BB84
protocol and Z := F2 × Js × F2 × Js for the six-state protocol. Note that
Alice and Bob generate a secret key from the first n measurement outcomes
(x,y) ∈ Fn2 × Fn2 , and they estimate an unknown density operator ρAB by
using the latter measurement outcomes z ∈ Zm, which we call the sample
sequence. When we do not have to discriminate between the BB84 protocol
and the six-state protocol, we omit the subscripts of Jb and Js, and denote
them by J .
As is usual in QKD literatures, we assume4 that Eve can obtain her
information by conducting a measurement for an environment system HE
such that a purification ψABE of ρAB is a density operator of joint system
HA⊗HB ⊗HE. Therefore, Alice’s bit sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn), Bob’s bit
sequence y = (y1, . . . , yn), and the state in Eve’s system can be described
3In this thesis, we mainly consider a secret key generated from Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes by z-basis. Therefore, we occasionally omit the subscripts {x, y, z} of
bases, and the basis {|0〉, |1〉} is regarded as z-basis unless otherwise stated.
4By this assumption, we are considering the worst case, that is, the security under this
assumption implies the security for the situation in which Eve can conduct a measurement
for a subsystem HE′ of HE. This fact can be formally proved by using the monotonicity
of the trace distance, because the security is defined by using the trace distance in this
thesis (see Section 3.4.1).
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by the {ccq}-state
ρXYE =
∑
(x,y)∈Fn2×F
n
2
PnXY (x,y)|x,y〉〈x,y| ⊗ ρx,yE ,
where PnXY is the product distribution of PXY (x, y) := Tr[|x, y〉〈x, y|ρAB ],
and ρx,yE := ρ
x1,y1
E ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρxn,ynE for the normalized density operator ρx,yE of
TrAB[(|x, y〉〈x, y| ⊗ IE)ψABE ].
3.3 One-Way Information Reconciliation
When Alice and Bob have correlated classical sequences, x,y ∈ Fn2 , the
purpose of the IR procedure for Alice and Bob is to share the same classical
sequence by exchanging messages over the public authenticated channel,
where F2 is the field of order 2. Then, the purpose of the PA procedure
is to extract a secret key from the shared bit sequence. In this section, we
present the most basic IR procedure, the one-way IR procedure. In the
one-way IR procedure, only Alice (resp. Bob) transmit messages to Bob
(resp. Alice) over the public channel.
Before describing our IR procedure, we should review the basic facts of
linear codes. An [n, n− k] classical linear code C is an (n− k)-dimensional
linear subspace of Fn2 , and its parity check matrix M is an k × n matrix
of rank k with 0, 1 entries such that Mc = 0 for any codeword c ∈ C. By
using these preparations, our procedure is described as follows:
(i) Alice calculates the syndrome t = t(x) := Mx, and sends it to Bob
over the public channel.
(ii) Bob decodes (y, t) into an estimate of x by a decoder xˆ : Fn2×Fk2 → Fn2 .
In the QKD protocols, Alice and Bob do not know the probability dis-
tribution PXY in advance, and they estimate candidates {PXY,θ : θ ∈ Θ}
of the actual probability distribution PXY . In order to use the above IR
procedure in the QKD protocols, the decoding error probability have to
be universally small for any candidate of the probability distribution. For
3.3. One-Way Information Reconciliation 35
this reason, we introduce the concept that an IR procedure is δ-universally-
correct5 as follows.
Definition 3.3.1 We define an IR procedure to be δ-universally-correct for
the class {PXY,θ : θ ∈ Θ} of probability distributions if
PnXY,θ({(x,y) : x 6= xˆ(y, t(x))}) ≤ δ
for every θ ∈ Θ.
An example of a decoder that fulfils the universality is the minimum
entropy decoder defined by
xˆ(y, t) := argmin
x:Mx=t
H(Pxy).
Theorem 3.3.2 [Csi82, Theorem 1] Let r be a real number that satisfies
r > min
θ∈Θ
H(Xθ|Yθ),
where the random variables (Xθ, Yθ) are distributed according to PXY,θ.
Then, for every sufficiently large n, there exists a k×n parity check matrix
M such that kn ≤ r and a constant E > 0 that does not depends on n,
and then the decoding error probability by the minimum entropy decoding
satisfies
PnXY,θ({(x,y) : x 6= xˆ(y, t(x))}) ≤ e−nE
for every θ ∈ Θ.
Remark 3.3.3 Conventionally, we used the error correcting code instead
of the Slepian-Wolf coding in the IR procedure (e.g. [SP00]). In this remark,
5Early papers of QKD protocols did not consider the universality of the IR procedure.
The need for the universality was first pointed out by Hamada [Ham04] as long as the
author’s knowledge.
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we show that the leakage of information to Eve in the above IR procedure
is as small as that in the IR procedure with the error correcting code.
Furthermore, we show the sufficient and necessary condition for that the
former equals to the latter.
For appropriately chosen linear code C ⊂ Fn2 , the IR procedure with the
error correcting (linear) code is conducted as follows.
(i) Alice randomly choose a code word c ∈ C, and sends c + x to Bob
over the public channel.
(ii) Bob decodes c + x + y into an estimate cˆ of the code word c by
a decoder from Fn2 to C. Then, he obtains an estimate xˆ of x by
subtracting cˆ from the received public message c+ x.
Note that Step (i) is equivalent to sending the syndrome Mx ∈ Fk2 to Bob
from the view point of Eve, because Eve can know to which coset of Fn2/C
Alice’s sequence x belongs by knowing c + x. However, the length k of
the syndrome have to be larger than that in the IR procedure with the
Slepian-Wolf coding by the following reason.
Define a probability distribution6 on F2 as
PW (w) :=
∑
y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (y +w|y). (3.1)
Then the error w := x+y between Alice and Bob’s sequences is distributed
according to PnW . Since we can regard that the code word c is transmitted
over the binary symmetric channel (BSC) with the crossover probability
PW (1), the converse of the channel coding theorem [CT06] implies that
dim C/n = 1 − k/n have to be smaller than 1 −H(W ). By using the log-
sum inequality [CT06] and Eq. (3.1), we have
H(X|Y )
=
∑
x,y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (x|y) log
1
PX|Y (x|y)
6For simplicity, we assume that there exists only one candidate of distribution PXY ,
and omit θ in this remark.
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=
∑
w,y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (y + w|y) log
PY (y)
PY (y)PX|Y (y +w|y)
≤
∑
w∈F2
PW (w) log
1
PW (w)
= H(W ),
and the equality holds if and only if PX|Y (w|0) equals PX|Y (1 + w|1) for
any w ∈ F2.
Remark 3.3.4 When we implement the above IR procedure, we should use
a parity check matrix with an efficient decoding algorithm. For example,
we may use the low density parity check (LDPC) matrix [Gal63] with the
sum-product algorithm.
For a given sequence y ∈ Fn2 , and a syndrome t ∈ Fk2, define a function
P ∗(xˆ) :=
n∏
j=1
PX|Y (xˆj|yj)
k∏
i=1
1

 ∑
l∈N(i)
xˆl = ti

 , (3.2)
where N(i) := {j |Mij = 1} for the parity check matrix M , and 1[·] is the
indicator function. The function P ∗(xˆ) is the non-normalized a posteriori
probability distribution on Fn2 given y and t. The sum-product algorithm is
a method to (approximately) calculate the marginal a posteriori probability,
i.e.,
P ∗j (xˆj) :=
∑
xˆl,l 6=j
P ∗(xˆ).
The definition of a posteriori probability in Eq. (3.2) is the only differ-
ence between the decoding for the Slepian-Wolf source coding and that for
the channel coding. More precisely, we replace [Mac03, Eq. (47.6)] with
Eq. (3.2), and use the algorithm in [Mac03, Section 47.3]. The above pro-
cedure is a generalization of [LXG02], and a special case of [CLME06].
In QKD protocols we should minimize the block error probability rather
than the bit error probability, because a bit error might propagate to other
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bits after the privacy amplification. Although the sum-product algorithm is
designed to minimize the bit error probability, it is known by computer sim-
ulations that the algorithm makes the block error probability small [Mac03].
Unfortunately, it has not been shown analytically that the LDPC ma-
trix with the sum-product algorithm can satisfy the condition in Definition
3.3.1. However, it has been shown that the LDPC matrix can satisfy the
condition in Definition 3.3.1 if we use the maximum a posteriori probabil-
ity (MAP) decoding with an estimated probability distribution [YMU09]7.
Since the sum-product algorithm is a approximation of the MAP decod-
ing, we expect that the LDPC matrix with the sum-product algorithm can
satisfy the condition in Definition 3.3.1 as well.
3.4 Channel Estimation and Asymptotic Key Gen-
eration Rate
3.4.1 Channel Estimation Procedure
In this section, we show the channel estimation procedure. The purpose of
the channel estimation procedure is to estimate an unknown Choi operator
ρ = ρAB ∈ Pc from the sample sequence z ∈ Zm. By using the estimate
of the Choi operator, we show a condition on the parameters (the rate of
the syndrome and the key generation rate) in the postprocessing such that
Alice and Bob can share a secure key (Theorem 3.4.3).
Let us start with the channel estimation procedure of the six-state pro-
tocol. In this thesis, we employ the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator:
ρˆ(z) := argmax
ρ∈Pc
Pmρ (z),
where Pmρ is m products of the probability distribution Pρ of the sample
symbol z ∈ Z defined by Pρ(z) := Tr[Mzρ].
7In [MUW05], Muramatsu et. al. has proposed to use the LDPC code and the MAP
decoding for the Slepian-Wolf code sysmtem. However, their result cannot be used in
the context of the QKD protocol, because there is an estimation error of the distribution
PXY .
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As we have seen in Section 1.2, the conditional von Neumann entropy
Hρ(X|E) := H(ρXE)−H(ρE)
plays an important role to decide the key generation rate in the postpro-
cessing, where
ρXE := TrB



∑
x∈F2
|x〉〈x| ⊗ IBE

ψABE

∑
x∈F2
|x〉〈x| ⊗ IBE




for a purification |ψABE〉 of ρ = ρAB. Therefore, we have to estimate this
quantity, Hρ(X|E). Actually, the estimator
Hˆz(X|E) := Hρˆ(z)(X|E)
is the ML estimator of Hρ(X|E) [CB02, Theorem 7.2.10].
Next, we consider the channel estimation procedure of the BB84 proto-
col. Although the Choi operator ρ is described by 12 real parameters (in the
Stokes parameterization), from Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8), we find that the distri-
bution Pρ only depends on the parameters ω := (Rzz, Rzx, Rxz, Rxx, tz, tx),
and does not depend on the parameters τ := (Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Ryy, ty).
Therefore, we regard the set
Ω := {ω ∈ R6 : ∃τ ∈ R6 (ω, τ) ∈ Pc}
as the parameter space, and denote Pρ by Pω. Then, we estimate the
parameters ω by the ML estimator:
ωˆ(z) := argmax
ω∈Ω
Pmω (z),
Since we cannot estimate the parameters τ , we have to consider the
worst case, and estimate the quantity
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E) (3.3)
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for a given ω ∈ Ω, where the set
Pc(ω) := {̺ = (ω′, τ ′) ∈ Pc : ω′ = ω}
is the candidates of Choi operators for a given ω ∈ Ω. Actually,
Hˆz(X|E) := min
̺∈Pc(ωˆ(z))
H̺(X|E)
is the ML estimator of the quantity in Eq. (3.3).
It is known that the ML estimator is a consistent estimator (with certain
conditions, which are satisfied in our case [Wal49]), that is, the quantities
µs(α,m) := P
m
ρ ({z : ‖ρˆ(z)− ρ‖ > α}) (3.4)
for the six-state protocol and
µb(α,m) := P
m
ω ({z : ‖ωˆ(z)− ω‖ > α}) (3.5)
for the BB84 protocol converge to 0 for any α > 0 as m goes to infinity. In
the rest of this thesis, we omit the subscripts of µs(α,m) and µb(α,m), and
denote them by µ(α,m).
Since Hρ(X|E) is a continuous function of ρ, which follows from the
continuity of the von Neumann entropy, there exists a function ηs(·) such
that
|Hˆz(X|E)−Hρ(X|E)| ≤ ηs(α) (3.6)
for ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α and ηs(α) → 0 as α → 0. Similarly, since Eq. (3.3) is
a continuous function of ω, which will be proved in Lemma 3.4.11, there
exists a function ηb(·) such that
|Hˆz(X|E) − min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E)| ≤ ηb(α) (3.7)
for ‖ωˆ(z) − ω‖ ≤ α and ηb(α) → 0 as α → 0. In the rest of this thesis, we
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omit the subscripts of ηs(·) and ηb(·), and denote them by η(·).
3.4.2 Sufficient Condition on Key Generation Rates for Se-
cure Key Agreement
In this section, we explain how Alice and Bob decides the parameters of the
postprocessing and conduct it. Then, we show a sufficient conditions on the
parameters such that Alice and Bob can share a secure key.
If the sample sequence is not contained in a prescribed acceptable region
Q ⊂ Zm (see Remark 3.4.4 for the definition), then Alice and Bob abort
the protocol. Otherwise, they decide the rate k(z)n of the linear code used
in the IR procedure according to the sample bit sequence z. Furthermore,
they also decide the length ℓ(z) of the finally distilled key according to the
sample sequence z. Then, they conduct the postprocessing as follows.
(i) Alice and Bob undertake the IR procedure of Section 3.3, and Bob
obtains the estimate xˆ of Alice’s raw key x.
(ii) Alice and Bob carry out the privacy amplification (PA) procedure to
distill a key pair (sA, sB) such that Eve has little information about
it. Alice first randomly chooses a function, f : Fn2 → {0, 1}ℓ(z), from
a universal hash family (see Definition 2.2.12), and sends the choice
of f to Bob over the public channel. Then, Alice’s distilled key is
sA = f(x) and Bos’s distilled key is sB = f(xˆ) respectively.
We have explained the procedures of the postprocessing so far. The
next thing we have to do is to define the security of the generated key
formally. By using the convention in Eq. (2.2) for the {ccq}-state ρXYE and
the mapping that describes the postprocessing, the generated key pair and
Eve’s available information can be described by a {cccq}-state, ρzSASBCE,
where classical system C consists of the random variable T that describe
the syndrome transmitted in the IR procedure and the random variable F
that describes the choice of the function in the PA procedure. It should
be noted that the {cccq}-state ρzSASBCE depends on the sample sequence
z because the parameters in the postprocessing is determined from it. To
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define the security of the distilled key pair (SA, SB), we use the universally
composable security definition [BOHL+05, RK05] (see also [Ren05]), which
is defined by the trace distance between the actual key pair and the ideal
key pair. We cannot state security of the QKD protocols in the sense that
the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is secure for a particular sample sequence z,
because there is a slight possibility that the channel estimation procedure
will underestimate Eve’s information.
Definition 3.4.1 The generated key pair is said to be ε-secure (in the sense
of the average over the sample sequence8) if
∑
z∈Q
Pmρ (z)
1
2
‖ρzSASBCE − ρz,mixSASB ⊗ ρzCE‖ ≤ ε (3.8)
for any (unknown) Choi operator ρ ∈ Pc initially shared by Alice and Bob,
where ρz,mixSASB :=
∑
s∈Sz
1
|Sz|
|s, s〉〈s, s| is the uniformly distributed key on the
key space Sz := {0, 1}ℓ(z).
Remark 3.4.2 [Ren05, Remark 6.1.3] The above security definition can be
subdivided into two conditions. If the generated key is ε-secret, i.e.,
∑
z∈Q
Pmρ (z)
1
2
‖ρzSACE − ρz,mixSA ⊗ ρzCE‖ ≤ ε
and δ-correct, i.e.,
∑
z∈Q
Pmρ (z)P
z
SASB
(sA 6= sB) ≤ δ,
then the generated key pair is (ε+ δ)-secure.
For a given Choi operator ρ ∈ Pc, we define the probability distribution
PXY,ρ ∈ P(F2 × F2) as
PXY,ρ(x, y) := Tr[(|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y|)ρ]. (3.9)
8If it is obvious from the context, we occasionally use terms “ε-secure”, “ε-secret”,
and “δ-correct” for specific realization z instead for average.
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Actually, PXY,ρ does not depend on the parameter τ in the BB84 protocol.
Therefor, we denote PXY,ρ by PXY,ω when we treat the BB84 protocol.
The following theorem gives a sufficient conditions on k(z) and ℓ(z) such
that the generated key pair is secure.
Theorem 3.4.3 For each sample sequence z ∈ Q, assume that the IR
procedure is δ-universally-correct for the class of distributions
{PXY,ρ : ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α}
in the six-state protocol, and for the class of distributions
{PXY,ω : ‖ωˆ(z) − ω‖ ≤ α}
in the BB84 protocol. For each z ∈ Q, if we set
ℓ(z)
n
< Hˆz(X|E) − η(α) − k(z)
n
− νn, (3.10)
then the distilled key pair is (ε+δ+µ(α,m))-secure, where νn := 5
√
log(3/ε)
n +
2 log(3/2ε)
n .
Proof. We only prove the statement for the six-state protocol, because
the statement for the BB84 protocol is proved exactly in the same way
by replacing ρ ∈ Pc with ω ∈ Ω and some other related quantities. The
assertion of the theorem follows from the combination of Corollary 2.2.14,
Remark 2.2.15, Lemma 2.2.10, and Eqs. (3.4), and (3.6).
For any ρ ∈ Pc, Eq. (3.4) means that ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α with probability
1− µ(α,m). When ‖ρˆ(z)− ρ‖ > α, the distilled key pair trivially satisfies
1
2
‖ρzSASBCE − ρz,mixSASB ⊗ ρzCE‖ ≤ 1.
On the other hand, when ‖ρˆ(z)− ρ‖ ≤ α, Eq. (3.10) implies
ℓ(z) < H
2ε/3
min (ρXE|E)− k(z)− 2 log(3/2ε)
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by using Lemma 2.2.10. Thus the distilled key satisfies
1
2
‖ρzSASBCE − ρz,mixSASB ⊗ ρzCE‖ ≤ ε+ δ
by Corollary 2.2.14, Remark 2.2.15, and the assumption that the IR proce-
dure is δ-universally-correct for the class of distribution {PXY,ρ : ‖ρˆ(z) −
ρ‖ ≤ α}. Averaging over the sample sequence z ∈ Q, we have the assertion
of the theorem. 
From Eq. (3.10), we find that the estimator Hˆz(X|E) of Eve’s ambiguity
and the syndrome rate k(z)n for the IR procedure are the important factors
to decide the key generation rate ℓ(z)n . In the next section, we investigate
the asymptotic behavior of the key generation rate derived from the right
hand side of Eq. (3.10).
Remark 3.4.4 The acceptable region Q ⊂ Zm is defined as follows: Each
z ∈ Zm belongs to Q if and only if the right hand side of Eq. (3.10) is
positive.
Remark 3.4.5 By switching the role of Alice and Bob, we obtain a post-
processing with the so-called reverse reconciliation9. On the other hand,
the original procedure is usually called the direct reconciliation.
In the reverse reconciliation, Bob sends syndrome My to Alice, and
Alice recovers the estimate yˆ of Bob’s sequence. Then, Alice and Bob’s
final keys are sA = f(yˆ) and sB = f(y) for a randomly chosen function
f : Fn2 → {0, 1}ℓ(z) from a universal hash family.
For the postprocessing with the reverse reconciliation, we can show al-
most the same statement as Theorem 3.4.3 by replacing Hˆz(X|E) with
Hˆz(Y |E), which is defined in a similar manner as Hˆz(X|E), and by using
δ-universally-correct for the reverse reconciliation.
In Section 3.6, we will show that the asymptotic key generation rate of
9The reverse reconciliation was originally proposed by Maurer in the classical key
agreement context [Mau93].
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the reverse reconciliation can be higher than that of the direct reconciliation.
Although the fact that the asymptotic key generation rate of the direct
reconciliation and the reverse reconciliation are different is already pointed
out for QKD protocols with weak coherent states [BBL05, Hay07], it is new
for the QKD protocols with qubit states.
Remark 3.4.6 Although Alice and Bob conducted the (direct) IR proce-
dure for the pair of bit sequence (x,y) in the postprocessing explained so far,
Alice can locally conducts a (stochastic) preprocessing for her bit sequence
before conducting the IR procedure. Surprisingly, Renner et al. [RGK05,
Ren05, KGR05] found that Alice should add noise to her bit sequence in
some cases, which is called the noisy preprocessing. In the postprocessing
with the noisy preprocessing, Alice first flip each bit with probability q and
obtain a bit sequence u. Then, Alice and Bob conduct the IR procedure
and the PA procedure for the pair (u,y). Renner et al. found that, by ap-
propriately choosing the value q, the key generation rate can be improved.
3.4.3 Asymptotic Key Generation Rate of The Six-State
Protocol
In this section, we derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula for the
six-state protocol. As we have seen in Section 3.4.1, the estimator Hˆz(X|E)
converges to the true value Hρ(X|E) in probability as m goes to infinity.
On the other hand, Theorem 3.3.2 implies that it is sufficient to set the rate
of the syndrome so that
k(z)
n
> minH̺(X|Y ) (3.11)
for sufficiently large n, where H̺(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy10 for the
random variables (X,Y ) that are distributed according to PXY,̺, and the
minimization is taken over the set {̺ : ‖ρˆ(z) − ̺‖ ≤ α}. Since the ML
estimator ρˆ(z) is a consistency estimator of ρ, we can set the sequence
10Equivalently, we can regard H̺(X|Y ) as the quantum conditional entropy for the
classical density operator ̺XY .
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of the syndrome rates so that it converges to Hρ(X|Y ) in probability as
m,n → ∞. Therefore, we can set the sequence of the key generation rates
so that it converges to the asymptotic key generation rate formula
Hρ(X|E) −Hρ(X|Y ) (3.12)
in probability as m,n→∞.
Similarly for the postprocessing with the reverse reconciliation, we can
set the sequence of the key generation rates so that it converges to the
asymptotic key generation rate formula
Hρ(Y |E)−Hρ(Y |X). (3.13)
3.4.4 Asymptotic Key Generation Rate of The BB84 Pro-
tocol
In this section, we derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula for the
BB84 protocol. As we have seen in Section 3.4.1, the estimator Hˆz(X|E)
converges to the true value min̺∈Pc(ω)H̺(X|E) in probability as m goes to
infinity. On the other hand, Theorem 3.3.2 implies that it is sufficient to
set the rate of the syndrome so that
k(z)
n
> minHω(X|Y ) (3.14)
for sufficiently large n, where Hω(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy for the
random variables (X,Y ) that are distributed according to PXY,ω, and the
minimization is taken over the set {ω′ : ‖ωˆ(z) − ω′‖ ≤ α}. Since the ML
estimator ωˆ(z) is a consistency estimator of ω, we can set the sequence
of the syndrome rates so that it converges to Hω(X|Y ) in probability as
m,n → ∞. Therefore, we can set the sequence of the key generation rates
so that it converges to the asymptotic key generation rate formula
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E) −Hω(X|Y ). (3.15)
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Similarly, for the postprocessing with the reverse reconciliation, we can
set the sequence of the key generation rates so that it converges to the
asymptotic key generation rate formula
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(Y |E)−Hω(Y |X). (3.16)
Although the asymptotic key generation rate formulae for the six-state
protocol (Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13)) do not involve the minimization, the
asymptotic key generation rate formulae for the BB84 protocol (Eqs. (3.15)
and (3.16)) involve the minimization, and therefore calculation of these for-
mula is not straightforward. The following propositions are very useful for
the calculation of the asymptotic key generation rate of the BB84 protocol.
Proposition 3.4.7 For two Choi operators ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Pc and a probabilis-
tically mixture ρ′ := λρ1 + (1 − λ)ρ2, Eve’s ambiguity is convex, i.e., we
have
Hρ′(X|E) ≤ λHρ1(X|E) + (1− λ)Hρ2(X|E),
where ρ′XE is {cq}-state derived from a purification ψ′ABE of ρ′AB.
Proof. For r = 1 and 2, let ψrABE be a purification of the ρ
r
AB . Then the
density operator ρrXE is derived by Alice’s measurement by z-basis and the
partial trace over Bob’s system, i.e.,
ρrXE = TrB
[∑
x
(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)ψrABE(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)
]
. (3.17)
Let
|ψ′ABER〉 :=
√
λ|ψ1ABE〉|1〉 +
√
1− λ|ψ2ABE〉|2〉
be a purification of ρ′AB, where HR is the reference system, and {|1〉, |2〉} is
48 Chapter 3. Channel Estimation
an orthonormal basis of HR. Let
ρ′XER := TrB
[∑
x
(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)ψ′ABER(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)
]
, (3.18)
and let
ρ∗XER :=
∑
r∈{1,2}
(I ⊗ |r〉〈r|)ρ′XER(I ⊗ |r〉〈r|)
= λρ1XE ⊗ |1〉〈1| + (1− λ)ρ2XE ⊗ |2〉〈2|
be the density operator such that the system HR is measured by {|1〉, |2〉}
basis. Then we have
Hρ′(X|ER)
= H(X) − Iρ′(X;ER)
≤ H(X) − Iρ∗(X;ER)
= Hρ∗(X|ER)
= λHρ1(X|E) + (1− λ)Hρ2(X|E),
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of the quantum mutual
information for measurements (data processing inequality) [Hay06]. By
renaming the systems ER to E, we have the assertion of the lemma. 
Remark 3.4.8 In a similar manner, we can also show the convexity
Hρ′(Y |E) ≤ λHρ1(Y |E) + (1− λ)Hρ2(Y |E)
under the same condition as in Proposition 3.4.7.
The following proposition reduces the number of free parameters in the
minimization of Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16).
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Proposition 3.4.9 For the BB84 protocol, the minimization in Eqs. (3.15)
and (3.16) is achieved by Choi operator ̺ whose components Rzy, Rxy, Ryz,
Ryx, and ty, are all 0.
Proof. The statement of this proposition easily follows from Proposition
3.4.7. We only prove the statement for Eq. (3.15) because the statement for
Eq. (3.16) can be proved exactly in the same manner.
For any ̺ ∈ Pc(ω), let ¯̺ be the complex conjugate of ̺. Note that
eigenvalues of density matrices are unchanged by the complex conjugate,
and thus Eve’s ambiguity H ¯̺(X|E) for ¯̺ equals to H̺(X|E). By applying
Proposition 3.4.7 for ρ1 = ̺, ρ2 = ¯̺, and λ = 12 , we have
H̺′(X|E) ≤ 1
2
H̺(X|E) + 1
2
H ¯̺(X|E),
where ̺′ = 12̺+
1
2 ¯̺. Note that the Stokes parameterization of ¯̺ is given by




Rzz Rzx −Rzy
Rxz Rxx −Rxy
−Ryz −Ryx Ryy

 ,


tz
tx
−ty



 ∈ Pc(ω).
Therefore, the components, Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, and ty, of the Stokes param-
eterization of ̺′ are all 0. Since Pc(ω) is a convex set, ̺′ ∈ Pc(ω). Since
̺ ∈ Pc(ω) was arbitrary, we have the assertion of the proposition. 
The following proposition can be used to calculate a lower bound on the
asymptotic key generation rate of the BB84 protocol.
Proposition 3.4.10 For the BB84 protocol, we have
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E)
≥1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
(3.19)
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and
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(Y |E)
≥1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
zx
2
)
, (3.20)
where dz and dx are the singular values of the matrix[
Rzz Rzx
Rxz Rxx
]
(3.21)
for ω := (Rzz, Rzx, Rxz, Rxx, tz, tx). The equalities in Eqs. (3.19) and (3.20)
hold if tz = tx = 0.
Proof. We only prove the statement for Eq. (3.19) because the statement
for Eq. (3.20) is proved exactly in a similar manner. By Proposition 3.4.9,
it suffice to consider the Choi operator ̺ of the form




Rzz Rzx 0
Rxz Rxx 0
0 0 Ryy

 ,


tz
tx
0



 .
Define another Choi operator ̺− := (σ¯y ⊗ σy)̺(σ¯y ⊗ σy) and the mixed one
̺′ := 12̺+
1
2̺
−. Since the Stokes parameterization of ̺− is




Rzz Rzx 0
Rxz Rxx 0
0 0 Ryy

 ,


−tz
−tx
0



 ,
the vector part (of the Stokes parameterization) of ̺′ is zero vector, and the
matrix part (of the Stokes parameterization) of ̺′ is the same as that of ̺.
Furthermore, since H̺(X|E) = H̺−(X|E), by using Proposition 3.4.7, we
have
H̺(X|E) ≥ H̺′(X|E).
3.4. Channel Estimation and Asymptotic Key Generation Rate 51
The equality holds if tz = tx = 0.
The rest of the proof is to calculate the minimization of H̺′(X|E) with
respect to Ryy. By the singular value decomposition, we can decompose the
matrix R′ corresponding to the Choi operator ̺′ as
O2


d˜z 0 0
0 d˜x 0
0 0 Ryy

O1,
where O1 and O2 are some rotation matrices within z-x-plane, and |d˜z| and
|d˜x| are the singular value of the matrix in Eq. (3.21). Then, we have
min
Ryy
H̺′(X|E)
= min
Ryy

1−H(̺′) + ∑
x∈F2
1
2
H(̺′xB)


= 1−max
Ryy
H[qi, qz, qx, qy] + h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
= 1− h(qi + qz)− h(qi + qx) + h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
,
where (qi, qz, qx, qy) are the eigenvalues of the Choi operator ̺
′, and ̺′xB :=
2TrA[(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)̺′]. Note that we used Eq. (2.5) to calculate the von Neu-
mann entropy H(̺′xB). By noting that qi+ qz =
1+d˜z
2 and qi+ qx =
1+d˜x
2 (see
Eqs. (3.42) and (3.43)), we have the statement for Eq. (3.19). 
The following lemma shows that the function
G(ω) := min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E) (3.22)
is a continuous function of ω, which we suspended in Section 3.4.1.
Lemma 3.4.11 The function G(ω) is a continuous function of ω (with
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respect to the Euclidean distance) for any ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Owing to Proposition 3.4.9, we have
G(ω) = min
Ryy∈P ′c(ω)
H̺(X|E),
where ̺ = (ω, 0, 0, 0, 0, Ryy , 0) and P ′c(ω) is the set of all Ryy such that
(ω, 0, 0, 0, 0, Ryy , 0) ∈ Pc(ω).
Since the conditional entropy is a continuous function, the following
statement is suffice for proving that G(ω) is continuous function at any
ω0 ∈ Ω. For any ω ∈ Ω such that ‖ω − ω0‖ ≤ ε, there exist ε′, ε′′ > 0 such
that
P ′c(ω) ⊂ Bε′(P ′c(ω0)), (3.23)
P ′c(ω0) ⊂ Bε′′(P ′c(ω)), (3.24)
and ε′ and ε′′ converge to 0 as ε goes to 0, where Bε′(P ′c(ω0)) is the ε′-
neighbor of the set P ′c(ω0).
Define the set P ′′c := {(ω,Ryy) : ω ∈ Ω, Ryy ∈ P ′c(ω)}, which is a closed
convex set. Define functions
U(ω) := max
Ryy∈P ′c(ω)
Ryy,
L(ω) := min
Ryy∈P ′c(ω)
Ryy
as the upper surface and the lower surface of the set P ′′c respectively. Then
U(ω) and L(ω) are concave and convex functions respectively, because P ′′c
is a convex set. Thus, U(ω) and L(ω) are continuous functions except the
extreme points of Ω. For any extreme point ω′ of Ω and for any interior
point ω of Ω, we have U(ω) ≥ U(ω′) and L(ω) ≤ L(ω′), because P ′′c is
a convex set. Since P ′′c is a closed set, we have limω→ω′ U(ω) ∈ P ′c(ω′)
and limω→ω′ L(ω) ∈ P ′c(ω′), which implies that U(ω′) = limω→ω′ U(ω) and
L(ω′) = limω→ω′ L(ω). Thus U(ω) and L(ω) are also continuous at the
extreme points. Since P ′c(ω) is a convex set, the continuity of U(ω) and
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L(ω) implies that Eqs. (3.23) and (3.24) hold for some ε′, ε′′ > 0, and ε′ and
ε′′ converge to 0 as ε goes to 0. 
3.5 Comparison to Conventional Estimation
In this section, we show the conventional channel estimation procedure, and
the asymptotic key generation rate formulas with the conventional channel
estimation. Then, we show that the asymptotic key generation rates with
our proposed channel estimation are at least as high as those with the
conventional channel estimation for the six-state protocol (Theorem 3.5.1)
and the BB84 protocol (Theorem 3.5.5) respectively.
In the conventional channel estimation procedure, Alice and Bob discard
those bits if their bases disagree. Furthermore, they ignore the difference
between (x, y) = (0, 1) and (x, y) = (1, 0). Mathematically, these discarding
and ignoring can be described by a function g : Z → Z˜ := F˜2 × J × J
defined by
g(z) = g((x, a, y, b)) :=
{
(x+ y, a, b) if a = b
(∆, a, b) else
,
where F˜2 := F2 ∪ {∆} and ∆ is a dummy symbol indicating that Alice and
Bob discarded that sample bit.
3.5.1 Six-State Protocol
In the conventional estimation, Alice and Bob estimate ρ ∈ Pc from the
degraded sample sequence g(z) := (g(z1), . . . , g(zm)). Although the Choi
operator ρ is described by 12 real parameters (in the Stokes parameteriza-
tion), from Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8), we find that the distribution
P˜ρ(z˜) = Pρ({z ∈ Z : g(z) = z˜})
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of the degraded sample symbol z˜ ∈ Z˜ only depends on the parameters γ =
(Rzz, Rxx, Ryy), and does not depend on the parameters κ = (Rzx, Rzy, Rxz, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, tz, tx, ty).
Therefore, we regard the set
Γ := {γ ∈ R3 : ∃κ ∈ R9 (γ, κ) ∈ Pc}
as the parameter space, and denote P˜ρ by P˜γ . Then, we estimate the pa-
rameters γ by the ML estimator:
γˆ(z˜) := argmax
γ∈Γ
P˜mγ (z˜)
for z˜ ∈ Z˜m.
Since we cannot estimate the parameters κ, we have to consider the
worst case, and estimate the quantity
min
̺∈Pc(γ)
H̺(X|E)
for a given γ ∈ Γ, where the set
Pc(γ) := {̺ = (γ′, κ′) ∈ Pc : γ′ = γ}
is the candidates of Choi operators for a given γ ∈ Γ.
By following similar arguments as in Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.3, we
can derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula of the postprocessing
with the direct reconciliation
min
̺∈Pc(γ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )]. (3.25)
We can also derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula of the post-
processing with the reverse reconciliation
min
̺∈Pc(γ)
[H̺(Y |E)−H̺(Y |X)]. (3.26)
Since Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26) involves the minimizations, we have the
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following straight forward but important theorem.
Theorem 3.5.1 The asymptotic key generation rates for the direct and
the reverse reconciliation with our proposed channel estimation procedure
(Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13)) are at least as high as those with the conventional
channel estimation procedure (Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26)) respectively.
The following proposition gives an explicit expression of Eqs. (3.25) and
(3.26) for any Choi operator. The following proposition also clarifies that the
asymptotic key generation rates of the direct and the reverse reconciliation
coincide for any Choi operator if we use the conventional channel estimation
procedure. Although the following proposition is implicitly stated in the
literatures [RGK05, Ren05, KGR05], we present it for readers’ convenience.
Proposition 3.5.2 For any ρ = (γ, τ) ∈ Pc, we have
min
̺∈Pc(γ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )] (3.27)
= min
̺∈Pc(γ)
[H̺(Y |E)−H̺(Y |X)] (3.28)
= 1−H[pi, pz, px, py], (3.29)
where the distribution (pi, pz, px, py) is given by
pi =
1 +Rzz +Rxx +Ryy
4
,
pz =
1 +Rzz −Rxx −Ryy
4
,
px =
1−Rzz +Rxx −Ryy
4
,
py =
1−Rzz −Rxx +Ryy
4
.
Proof. We only prove the equality between Eqs. (3.27) and (3.29), because
the equality between Eqs. (3.28) and (3.29) can be proved exactly in the
same manner.
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For any ̺ ∈ Pc(γ), let ̺z := (σz⊗σz)̺(σz⊗σz), ̺x := (σx⊗σx)̺(σx⊗σx),
and ̺y := (σy ⊗ σy)̺(σy ⊗ σy). Then, ̺z, ̺x, and ̺y also belong to the set
Pc(γ). Define the (partial) twirled11 Choi operator
̺tw :=
1
4
̺+
1
4
̺z +
1
4
̺x +
1
4
̺y.
Then, the convexity of Pc(γ) implies ̺tw ∈ Pc(γ), and we can also find
that the vector components (in the Stokes parameterization) of ̺tw is the
zero vector and the matrix components (in the Stokes parameterization)
of ̺tw is the diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries Rzz, Rxx, and Ryy.
Furthermore, we find that ̺tw = ρtw for any ̺ ∈ Pc(γ).
By using Proposition 3.4.7 (twice), we have
min
̺∈Pc(γ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )]
≥ Hρtw(X|E)
= 1−H(̺tw) +
∑
x∈F2
1
2
H(̺twxB )
= 1−H[qi, qz, qx, qy] + h
(
1 +Rzz
2
)
, (3.30)
where ̺twxB := 2TrA[(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)̺tw].
In a similar manner as in Remark 3.3.3, we have
H̺(X|Y ) ≤ H̺(W ) = Hρtw(W ) = h
(
1 +Rzz
2
)
(3.31)
for any ̺ ∈ Pc(γ), where H̺(W ) is the entropy of the random variable W
whose distribution is
PW,̺(w) :=
∑
y∈F2
PXY,̺(y + w, y).
11The (partial) twirling was a technique to convert any bipartite density operator into
the Bell diagonal state (see Section 4.5.1 for the definition of the Bell diagonal state).
The (partial) twirling was first proposed by Bennett et al. [BDSW96].
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Combining Eqs. (3.30) and (3.31), we have the equality between Eqs. (3.27)
and (3.29). 
Remark 3.5.3 As we can find in the proof of Proposition 3.5.2, the use of
the IR procedure (with the linear Slepian-Wolf coding) proposed in Section
3.3 and the use of the IR procedure (with the error correcting code) pre-
sented in Remark 3.3.3 make no difference to the asymptotic key generation
rate if we use the conventional channel estimation procedure.
Remark 3.5.4 It should be noted that Eq. (3.29) is the well known asymp-
totic key generation rate formula [Lo01], which can be derived by using the
technique based on the CSS code (See Section 1.1 for the CSS code tech-
nique).
3.5.2 BB84 Protocol
In the conventional estimation, Alice and Bob estimate ρ ∈ Pc from the
degraded sample sequence g(z) := (g(z1), . . . , g(zm)). Although the Choi
operator ρ is described by 12 real parameters (in the Stokes parameteriza-
tion), from Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8), we find that the distribution
P˜ω(z˜) = Pω({z ∈ Z : g(z) = z˜})
of the degraded sample symbol z˜ ∈ Z˜ only depends on the parameters υ =
(Rzz, Rxx), and does not depend on the parameters ς = (Rzx, Rzy, Rxz, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Ryy, tz, tx, ty).
Therefore, we regard the set
Υ := {υ ∈ R2 : ∃ς ∈ R10, (υ, ς) ∈ Pc}
as the parameter space, and denote P˜ω by P˜υ. Then, we estimate the
parameters υ by the ML estimator:
υˆ(z˜) := argmax
υ∈Υ
P˜mυ (z˜)
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for z˜ ∈ Z˜m.
Since we cannot estimate the parameters ς, we have to consider the
worst case, and estimate the quantity
min
̺∈Pc(υ)
H̺(X|E)
for a given υ ∈ υ, where the set
Pc(υ) := {̺ = (υ′, ς ′) ∈ Pc : υ′ = υ}
is the candidates of Choi operators for a given υ ∈ Υ.
By following similar arguments as in Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.4, we
can derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula of the postprocessing
with the direct reconciliation
min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )]. (3.32)
We can also derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula of the post-
processing with the reverse reconciliation
min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(Y |E) −H̺(Y |X)]. (3.33)
Since the range Pc(ω) of the minimizations in Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16) is
smaller than the range Pc(υ) of the minimizations in Eqs. (3.32) and (3.33),
we have the following obvious but important theorem.
Theorem 3.5.5 The asymptotic key generation rates for the direct and
the reverse reconciliation with our proposed channel estimation procedure
(Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16)) are at least as high as those with the conventional
channel estimation procedure (Eqs. (3.32) and (3.33)) respectively.
The following proposition gives an explicit expression of Eqs. (3.32) and
(3.33) for any Choi operator. The following proposition also clarifies that the
asymptotic key generation rates of the direct and the reverse reconciliation
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coincide for any Choi operator if we use the conventional channel estimation
procedure. Although the following proposition is implicitly stated in the
literatures [RGK05, Ren05, KGR05], we present it for readers’ convenience.
Proposition 3.5.6 For any ρ = (υ, ς) ∈ Pc, we have
min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )] (3.34)
= min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(Y |E)−H̺(Y |X)] (3.35)
= 1− h
(
1 +Rzz
2
)
− h
(
1 +Rxx
2
)
. (3.36)
Proof. This proposition is proved in a similar manner as Proposition 3.5.2.
Therefore, we omit the proof. 
Remark 3.5.7 It should be noted that the same remark as Remark 3.5.3
also holds for the BB84 protocol.
Remark 3.5.8 It should be noted that Eq. (3.36) is with the well known
asymptotic key generation rate formula [SP00], which can be derived by
using the technique based on the CSS code (See Section 1.1 for the CSS
code technique).
3.6 Asymptotic Key Generation Rates for Specific
Channels
In this section, we calculate the asymptotic key generation rates of the BB84
protocol and the six-state protocol for specific channels, and clarify the ad-
vantage to use our proposed channel estimation instead of the conventional
channel estimation.
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3.6.1 Amplitude Damping Channel
When the channel between Alice and Bob is an amplitude damping channel,
the Stokes parameterization of the corresponding density operator ρp ∈ Pc
is




1− p 0 0
0
√
1− p 0
0 0
√
1− p

 ,


p
0
0



 , (3.37)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
For the six-state protocol, since there are no minimization in Eqs. (3.12)
and (3.13), there are no difficulty to calculate Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13).
Next, we consider the BB84 protocol. For ω = (1− p, 0, 0,√1− p, p, 0),
Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16) can be calculated as follows. By Proposition 3.4.9, it is
sufficient to consider ̺ ∈ Pc(ω) such that Rzy = Rxy = Ryz = Ryx = ty = 0.
Furthermore, by the condition on the TPCP map [FA99]
(Rxx −Ryy)2 ≤ (1−Rzz)2 − t2z ,
we can decide the remaining parameter asRyy =
√
1− p. Therefore, Eqs. (3.15)
and (3.16) coincide with the true values respectively. Furthermore, the
asymptotic key generation rates for the BB84 protocol coincide with those
for the six-state protocol.
The asymptotic key generation rates for the direct and the reverse rec-
onciliations can be written as functions of the parameter p:
h
(
1 + p
2
)
− h
(p
2
)
(3.38)
and
1− h
(p
2
)
(3.39)
respectively. They are plotted in Fig. 3.1.
From Fig. 3.1, we find that the asymptotic key generation rate with
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the reverse reconciliation is higher than that with the forward reconcilia-
tion. Actually, they are analyzed in detail as follows. By a straightforward
calculation, we have
Hρ(X|E) = 1 + 1
2
h (p)− h
(p
2
)
= Hρ(XY )− h
(p
2
)
and
Hρ(Y |E) = h
(
1 + p
2
)
+
1 + p
2
h
(
1
1 + p
)
− h
(p
2
)
= Hρ(XY )− h
(p
2
)
,
where Hρ(XY ) is the entropy of the random variables with distribution
PXY,ρ. Therefore, the difference between the asymptotic key generation rate
with the forward and the reverse reconciliations comes from the difference
between Hρ(X|Y ) and Hρ(Y |X), which is equal to the difference between
Hρ(Y ) and Hρ(X) = 1. Note that Hρ(Y ) goes to 0 as p→ 1.
The Bell diagonal entries of the Choi operator ρp are
1
4(2+2
√
1− p−p),
1
4p,
1
4(2−2
√
1− p−p), and 14p. When Alice and Bob only use the degraded
statistic, i.e., when Alice and Bob use the conventional channel estimation,
the asymptotic key generation rates of the six-state protocol and the BB84
protocol can be calculated only from the Bell diagonal entries (Propositions
3.5.2 and 3.5.6), and are also plotted in Fig. 3.1.
Remark 3.6.1 As is mentioned in Remark 3.4.6, there is a possibility to
improve the asymptotic key generation rate in Eq. (3.12) by the noisy pre-
processing. If a {ccq}-state ρXY E derived from a Choi operator ρ ∈ Pc
satisfies the condition below, we can show that the noisy preprocessing does
not improve the asymptotic key generation rate.
We define a {ccq}-state
ρXY E =
∑
x,y∈F2
PXY (x, y)|x, y〉〈x, y| ⊗ ρx,yE
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates against the
parameter p of the amplitude damping channel (see Eq. (3.37)). “Reverse”
and “Direct” are the asymptotic key generation rates when we use the re-
verse reconciliation and the direct reconciliation with our channel estimation
procedure (Eqs. (3.39) and (3.38)) respectively. “Conventional six-state”
and “Conventional BB84” are the asymptotic key generation rates of the
six-state protocol and the BB84 protocol with the conventional channel es-
timation procedure. Note that the protocols with the conventional channel
estimation procedure involves the noisy preprocessing [RGK05, KGR05] in
the postprocessing.
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to be degradable state12 (from Alice to Bob and Eve) if there exist states
{ρˆyE}y∈F2 satisfying∑
y∈F2
PY |X(y|x)ρˆyE = ρxE :=
∑
y∈F2
PY |X(y|x)ρx,yE
for any x ∈ F2. If a {ccq}-state ρXY E derived from a Choi operator ρ is
degradable, then the asymptotic key generation rate in Eq. (3.12) is optimal,
that is, it cannot be improved by the noisy preprocessing.
The above statement is proved as follows. Even if we know the Choi
operator ρ in advance, the asymptotic key generation rate of any postpro-
cessing is upper bounded by the quantum intrinsic information13
Iρ(X;Y ↓ E) := inf Iρ(X;Y |E′),
where
Iρ(X;Y |E′) := Hρ(XE) +Hρ(Y E)−Hρ(XY E)−Hρ(E)
is the quantum conditional mutual information, and the infimum is taken
over all {ccq}-states ρXYE′ = (id⊗NE→E′)(ρXY E) for CPTP maps NE→E′
from system E to E′ [CEH+07]. Taking the identity map idE, the quantum
conditional mutual information Iρ(X;Y |E) itself is an upper bound on the
asymptotic key generation rate for any postprocessing.
Since we are now considering the postprocessing in which only Alice
sends the public message, the maximum of the asymptotic key generation
rate only depends on the distribution PXY and {cq}-state ρXE . Thus the
maximum of the asymptotic key generation rate for ρXY E is equals to that
12The concept of the degradable state is an analogy of the degradable channel [DS05].
For the degradable channel, the quantum wire-tap channel capacity [Dev05] is known to
be achievable without any auxiliary random variable [Smi08, Hay06].
13It is the quantum analogy of the intrinsic information proposed by Maurer and Wolf
[MW99].
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for degraded version of it,
ρˆXYE :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρˆyE .
Applying the above upper bound Iρ(X;Y |E) for the degraded {ccq}-state
ρˆXY E, the maximum of the asymptotic key generation rate is upper bounded
by
Iρˆ(X;Y |E)
= Iρˆ(X;Y E)− Iρˆ(X;E)
= Hρˆ(X|E) −H(X|Y ) + Iρˆ(X;E|Y )
= Hρ(X|E) −H(X|Y ),
which is the desired upper bound, and equals to Eq. (3.12).
For the amplitude damping channel, we can show that the {ccq}-state
ρXY E is degradable by a straightforward calculation. Therefore, the asymp-
totic key generation rate in Eq. (3.12) is optimal for the amplitude damping
channel.
Although we exclusively considered a key generated from the bit se-
quences transmitted and received by the z-basis, we can also obtain a key
from the bit sequences transmitted and received by the x-basis (or the y-
basis for the six-state protocol). In this case, the asymptotic key generation
rates are also given by Eqs. (3.12), (3.13), (3.15), and (3.16), where the
definition of the {cq}-state ρXE and the distribution PXY must be replaced
appropriately.
For the amplitude damping channel14, the asymptotic key generation
rates for the forward and the reverse reconciliations can be written as func-
14By the symmetry of the amplitude damping channel for the x-basis and the y-basis,
the asymptotic key generation rates for the y-basis are the same as those for the x-basis
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tions of the parameter p:
1 + h
(
1 +
√
1− p+ p2
2
)
− h
(p
2
)
− h
(
1 +
√
1− p
2
)
, (3.40)
and
1− h
(p
2
)
(3.41)
respectively. They are plotted in Fig. 3.2, and compared to the asymptotic
key generation rates with the conventional channel estimation.
From Fig. 3.2, we find that the asymptotic key generation rate with
the reverse reconciliation is higher than that with the forward reconcilia-
tion. Although the difference between the asymptotic key generation rate
with the forward and the reverse reconciliations comes from the difference
between Hρ(X|Y ) and Hρ(Y |X) in the case of the z-basis, the difference be-
tween the asymptotic key generation rate with the forward and the reverse
reconciliations comes from the difference between Hρ(X|E) and Hρ(Y |E),
because Hρ(X|Y ) = Hρ(Y |X) in the case of the x-basis.
3.6.2 Unital Channel and Rotation Channel
A channel is called a unital channel if EB maps the completely mixed state
I/2 to itself, or equivalently the corresponding Choi operator ρ ∈ Pc satis-
fies TrA[ρ] = I/2. In the Stokes parameterization, a unital channel (R, t)
satisfies that t is the zero vector. The unital channel has the following
physical meaning in QKD protocols. When Eve conducts the Pauli cloning
[Cer00] with respect to an orthonormal basis that is a rotated version of
{|0z〉, |1z〉}, the quantum channel from Alice to Bob is not a Pauli channel
but a unital channel. It is natural to assume that Eve cannot determine the
direction of the basis {|0z〉, |1z〉} accurately, and the unital channel deserve
consideration in the QKD research as well as the Pauli channel.
By the singular value decomposition, we can decompose the matrix R
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates against the
parameter p of the amplitude damping channel (see Eq. (3.37)) for a key
generated from the bit sequences transmitted and received by the x-basis.
“Reverse” and “Direct” are the asymptotic key generation rates when we use
the reverse reconciliation and the direct reconciliation with our channel esti-
mation procedure (Eqs. (3.41) and (3.40)) respectively. “Conventional six-
state” and “Conventional BB84” are the asymptotic key generation rates of
the six-state protocol and the BB84 protocol with the conventional channel
estimation procedure. Note that the protocols with the conventional chan-
nel estimation procedure involves the noisy preprocessing [RGK05, KGR05]
in the postprocessing.
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of the Stokes parameterization as
O2


ez 0 0
0 ex 0
0 0 ey

O1, (3.42)
where O1 and O2 are some rotation matrices
15, and |ez|, |ex|, and |ey| are the
singular value of the matrix R16. Thus, we can consider the unital channel
as a composition of a unitary channel, a Pauli channel
ρ 7→ qiρ+ qzσzρσz + qxσxρσx + qyσyρσy,
and a unitary channel [BW04], where
qi =
1+ez+ex+ey
4 ,
qz =
1+ez−ex−ey
4 ,
qx =
1−ez+ex−ey
4 ,
qy =
1−ez−ex+ey
4 .
(3.43)
For the six-state protocol, we can derive simple forms of Hρ(X|E) and
Hρ(Y |E) as follows.
Lemma 3.6.2 For the unital channel, we have
Hρ(X|E) = 1−H[qi, qz, qx, qy] + h

1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz +R
2
yz
2

 (3.44)
and
Hρ(Y |E) = 1−H[qi, qz, qx, qy] + h

1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
zx +R
2
zy
2

 . (3.45)
15The rotation matrix is the real orthogonal matrix with determinant 1.
16The decomposition is not unique because we can change the order of (ez, ex, ey) or the
sign of them by adjusting the rotation matrices O1 and O2. However, the result in this
paper does not depends on a choice of the decomposition.
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Proof. We omit the proof because it can be proved in a similar manner as
the latter half of the proof of Proposition 3.4.10. 
From this lemma, we can find that R2xz+R
2
yz = R
2
zx+R
2
zy is the necessary and
sufficient condition for Hρ(X|E) = Hρ(Y |E). Furthermore, we can show
Hρ(X|Y ) = Hρ(Y |X) = h((1 +Rzz)/2) by a straightforward calculation.
For the BB84 protocol, Pc(ω) consists of infinitely many elements in
general. By using Proposition 3.4.10, we can calculate Eve’s worst case
ambiguity as
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E)
=1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
(3.46)
and
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(Y |E)
=1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
zx
2
)
, (3.47)
where dz and dx are the singular values of the matrix
[
Rzz Rzx
Rxz Rxx
]
. From
these formulae, we find that Rxz = Rzx is the necessary and sufficient
condition for min̺∈Pc(ω)H̺(X|E) coincides with min̺∈Pc(ω)H̺(Y |E). It
should be noted that the singular values (dz, dx) are different from the sin-
gular values (|ez|, |ex|) in general because there exist off-diagonal elements
(Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx). By a straightforward calculation, we can show that
Hω(X|Y ) = Hω(Y |X) = h((1 +Rzz)/2).
In the rest of this section, we analyze a special class of the unital channel,
the rotation channel, for the BB84 protocol. The rotation channel is a
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channel whose Stokes parameterization is given by




cos ϑ − sinϑ 0
sinϑ cos ϑ 0
0 0 1

 ,


0
0
0



 .
The rotation channels occur, for example, when the directions of the trans-
mitter and the receiver are not properly aligned.
For the rotation channel, Eq. (3.46) gives min̺∈Pc(ω)H̺(X|E) = 1,
which implies that Eve gained no information. Thus, Eve’s worst case am-
biguity, min̺∈Pc(ω)H̺(X|E) coincide with the true value Hρ(X|E), and the
BB84 protocol can achieve the same asymptotic key generation rate as the
six-state protocol.
The reason why we show this example is that Alice and Bob can share
a secret key with a positive asymptotic key generation rate even though
the so-called error rate is higher than the 25% limit [GL03] in the BB84
protocol. The Bell diagonal entries of the Choi operator ρ that corresponds
to the rotation channel are cos2(ϑ/2), 0, 0, and sin2(ϑ/2). Thus the error
rate is sin2(ϑ/2). For π/3 ≤ ϑ ≤ 5π/3, the error rate is higher than 25%, but
we can obtain the positive key rate, 1− h(sin2(ϑ/2)) except ϑ = π/2, 3π/2.
Note that the asymptotic key generation rate in Eq. (3.32) is given by
1 − 2h(sin2(ϑ/2)). This fact verifies Curty et al’s suggestion [CLL04] that
key agreement might be possible even for the error rates higher than 25%
limits.
3.7 Condition for Strict Improvement
So far, we have seen that the asymptotic key generation rates with our pro-
posed channel estimation is at least as high as those with the conventional
channel estimation (Section 3.5), and that the former is strictly higher than
the latter for some specific channels (Section 3.6). For the BB84 protocol,
the following theorems show the necessary and sufficient condition such that
the former is strictly higher than the latter is that the channel is a Pauli
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channel.
Theorem 3.7.1 Suppose that Rzz 6= 0 and Rxx 6= 0. In the BB84 pro-
tocol, for the bit sequences transmitted and received by either z-basis or
the x-basis, the asymptotic key generation rates with our proposed chan-
nel estimation are strictly higher than those with the conventional channel
estimation if and only if (tz, tx) 6= (0, 0) or (Rzx, Rxz) 6= (0, 0).
Proof. We only prove the statement for the direct reconciliation, because
the statement for the reverse reconciliation can be proved in a similar man-
ner.
“only if” part Suppose that (tz, tx) = (0, 0) and (Rzx, Rxz) = (0, 0).
Then, Propositions 3.4.10 and 3.5.6 implies that Eq. (3.15) is equal to
Eq. (3.32). Similarly, the asymptotic key generation rate for the x-basis
with our proposed channel estimation is equal to that with the conventional
channel estimation.
“if” part Suppose that tz 6= 0. Let ̺∗ be the Choi operator satisfying
H̺∗(X|E) −H̺∗(X|Y ) = min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )].
Then, we have
H̺∗(X|Y ) = h
(
1 +Rzz
2
)
= Hω(W ),
where Hω(W ) is the entropy of the distribution defined by
PW,ω(w) :=
∑
y∈F2
PXY,ω(y + w, y).
Then, tz 6= 0 and the arguments at the end of Remark 3.3.3 imply
Hω(X|Y ) < Hω(W ).
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Since
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E) ≥ min
̺∈Pc(υ)
H̺(X|E) ≥ H̺∗(X|E),
Eq. (3.15) is strictly higher than Eq. (3.32). In a similar manner, we can
show that the asymptotic key generation rate for the x-basis with our pro-
posed channel estimation is strictly higher that that with the conventional
channel estimation if tx 6= 0.
Suppose that (tz, tx) = (0, 0) and Rzx 6= 0. By using Proposition 3.4.10,
we have
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
H̺(X|E) −Hω(X|Y )
= 1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
− h
(
1 +Rzz
2
)
. (3.48)
By the singular value decomposition, we have
[
Rzz Rzx
Rxz Rxx
]
= B diag[dz, dx] A
=
[
〈Bz|
〈Bx|
][
dz 0
0 dx
] [
|Az〉 |Ax〉
]
=
[
〈Bz|A˜z〉 〈Bz|A˜x〉
〈Bx|A˜z〉 〈Bx|A˜x〉
]
,
where A and B are the rotation matrices, and we set 〈A˜z| = (dzAzz, dxAzx)
and 〈A˜x| = (dzAxz, dxAxx). From Proposition 3.5.6, we have
min
̺∈Pc(υ)
[H̺(X|E) −H̺(X|Y )]
= 1− h
(
1 + 〈Bz|A˜z〉
2
)
− h
(
1 + 〈Bx|A˜x〉
2
)
. (3.49)
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Subtracting Eq. (3.49) from Eq. (3.48), we have
h
(
1 + 〈Bx|A˜x〉
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
> h
(
1 + ‖|A˜x〉‖
2
)
+ h
(
1 + ‖|A˜z〉‖
2
)
− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
= h
(
1 +
√
d2zA
2
xz + dxA
2
xx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
d2zA
2
zz + d
2
xA
2
zx
2
)
− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
≥ A2xzh
(
1 + dz
2
)
+A2xxh
(
1 + dx
2
)
+A2zzh
(
1 + dz
2
)
+A2zxh
(
1 + dx
2
)
− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
= 0, (3.50)
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of the function
h
(
1 +
√
x
2
)
,
which can be shown by a straight forward calculation. Thus, we have shown
that Eq. (3.15) is strictly higher than Eq. (3.32). In a similar manner, we
can show that the asymptotic key generation rate for the x-basis with our
proposed channel estimation is strictly higher that with the conventional
channel estimation if Rxz 6= 0. 
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3.8 Summary
The results in this chapter is summarized as follows: In Section 3.2, we
formally described the problem setting of the QKD protocols.
In Section 3.3, we showed the most basic IR procedure with one-way
public communication. We introduced the condition such the IR proce-
dure is universally correct (Definition 3.3.1). This condition was required
because the IR procedure have to be robust against the fluctuation of the
estimated probability of Alice and Bob’s bit sequences. We also explained
the conventionally used IR procedure with the error correcting code, and we
clarified that the length of the syndrome that must be transmitted in the
conventional IR procedure is larger than that in our IR procedure (Remark
3.3.3). We showed how to apply the LDPC code with the sum product
algorithm in our IR procedure (Remark 3.3.4).
In Section 3.4.1, we showed our proposed channel estimation procedure.
We clarified a sufficient condition on the key generation rate such that
Alice and Bob can share a secure key (Theorem 3.4.3), and we derived the
asymptotic key generation rate formulae. We developed some techniques
to calculate the asymptotic key generation rates (Propositions 3.4.9 and
3.4.10) for the BB84 protocol.
In Section 3.5, we explained the conventional estimation procedure.
Then, we derived the asymptotic key generation rate formulae with the
conventional channel estimation.
In Section 3.6, we investigated the asymptotic key generation rates for
some examples of channels. We also introduced the concept of the degrad-
able state, and we clarified that the asymptotic key generation rate in
Eq. (3.12) is optimal if the state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve is degradable
(Remark 3.6.1). For the rotation channel, we clarified that the asymptotic
key generation rate can be positive even if the error rate is higher than the
25% limit (Section 3.6.2).
Finally in Section 3.7, for the BB84 protocol we clarified the necessary
and sufficient condition such that the asymptotic key generation rates with
our proposed channel estimation is strictly higher than those with the con-
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ventional channel estimation is that the channel is a Pauli channel.
Chapter 4
Postprocessing
4.1 Background
The postprocessing shown in Chapter 3 consists of the IR procedure and
the PA procedure. Roughly speaking, Alice and Bob can share a secret key
with the key generation rate
Hρ(X|E) −Hρ(X|Y ) (4.1)
in that postprocessing. An interpretation of Eq. (4.1) is that the key gen-
eration rate is given by the difference between Eve’s ambiguity about Al-
ice’s bit sequence subtracted by Bob’s ambiguity about Alice’s bit sequence.
Therefore, when Eve’s ambiguity about Alice’s bit sequence is smaller than
Bob’s ambiguity about Alice’s bit sequence, the key generation rate of that
postprocessing is 0.
In [Mau93], Maurer proposed a procedure, the so-called advantage dis-
tillation. The advantage distillation is conducted before the IR procedure,
and the resulting postprocessing can have positive key generation rate even
though Eq. (4.1) is negative. Gottesman and Lo applied the advantage
distillation to the QKD protocols [GL03]. In the QKD protocols, the post-
processing with the advantage distillation was extensively studied by Bae
and Ac´ın [BA07].
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In this chapter, we propose a new kind of postprocessing, which can
be regarded as a generalization of the postprocessing that consists of the
advantage distillation, the IR procedure, and the PA procedure. In our
proposed postprocessing, the advantage distillation and the IR procedure
are combined into one procedure, the two-way IR procedure. After the
two-way IR procedure, we conduct the standard PA procedure.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we review
the advantage distillation. Then in Section 4.3, we propose the two-way in-
formation reconciliation procedure. In Section 4.4, we show a sufficient
condition of the key generation rate such that Alice and Bob can share a
secure key by our proposed postprocessing. In Section 4.5, we clarify that
the key generation rate of our proposed postprocessing is higher than the
other postprocessing by showing examples. Finally, we mention the rela-
tion between our proposed postprocessing and the entanglement distillation
protocols in Section 4.6.
4.2 Advantage Distillation
In order to clarify the relation between the two-way IR procedure and the
advantage distillation proposed by Maurer [Mau93], we review the postpro-
cessing with the advantage distillation in this section. For convenience, the
notations are adapted to this thesis. We assume that Alice and Bob have
correlated binary sequences x,y ∈ F2n2 of even length. The pair of sequences
(x,y) is independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a joint
probability distribution PXY ∈ P(F2 × F2).
First, we need to define some auxiliary random variables to describe the
postprocessing with the advantage distillation procedure. Let ξ : F22 → F2
be a function defined as ξ(a1, a2) := a1+a2 for a1, a2 ∈ F2, and let ζ : F22 →
F2 be a function defined as ζ(a, 0) := a and ζ(a, 1) := 0 for a ∈ F2. For a pair
of joint random variables ((X1, Y1), (X2, Y2)) with a distribution, P
2
XY , we
define random variables U1 := ξ(X1,X2), V1 := ξ(Y1, Y2) andW1 := U1+V1.
Furthermore, define random variables U2 := ζ(X2,W1), V2 := ζ(Y2,W1) and
W2 := U2 + V2. For the pair of sequences, x = (x11, x12, . . . , xn1, xn2) and
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y = (y11, y12, . . . , yn1, yn2), which is distributed according to P
2n
XY , let u, v
and w be 2n-bit sequences such that
ui1 := ξ(xi1, xi2), vi1 := ξ(yi1, yi2), wi1 := ui1 + vi1
and
ui2 := ζ(xi2, wi1), vi2 := ζ(yi2, wi1), wi2 := ui2 + vi2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the pair (u,v) and the discrepancy, w between u and
v are distributed according to the distribution PnU1U2V1V2W1W2 .
The purpose of the advantage distillation is to classify blocks of length
2 according to the parity wi1 of the discrepancies in each block. When PXY
is a distribution such that PX is the uniform distribution and PY |X is a
binary symmetric channel (BSC), the validity of this classification can be
understood because we have
H(Xi2|Yi1Yi2,Wi = 1) = 1.
This formula means that Alice have to send Xi2 itself if she want to tell Bob
Xi2. Therefore, they cannot obtain any secret key fromXi2, and they should
discard Xi2 if Wi = 1. For general PXY , the validity of above mentioned
classification is unclear. For this reason, we employ a function which is more
general than ζ in the next section.
By using above preparations, we can describe the postprocessing with
the advantage distillation as follows. First, Alice sends the parity sequence
u1 := (u11, . . . , un1) to Bob so that he can identify the parity sequence
w1 := (w11, . . . , wn1) of the discrepancies. Bob sends w1 back to Alice.
Then, they discard u1 and v1 := (v11, . . . , vn1) respectively, because u1
is revealed to Eve. As the final step of the advantage distillation, Alice
calculate1 the sequence u2 := (u12, . . . , un2) by using x and w1.
1Conventionally, Alice discard those blocks if wi1 = 1. In our procedure, Alice con-
vert the second bit of those blocks into the constant ui2 = 0, which is mathematically
equivalent to discarding those blocks.
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At the end of the advantage distillation, Alice has u2 and Bob has y
and w1 as a seed for the key agreement. By conducting the (one-way) IR
procedure and the PA procedure for (u2, (y,w1)), Alice and Bob share a
secret key.
4.3 Two-Way Information Reconciliation
In this section, we show the two-way IR procedure. The essential difference
between the two-way IR procedure and the advantage distillation is that
Alice does not send the sequence u1 itself. As is usual in information theory,
if we allow negligible error probability, Alice does not need to send the parity
sequence, u1, to Bob to identify parity sequence u1. More precisely, Bob
can decode u1 with negligible decoding error probability if Alice sends a
syndrome with a sufficient length. Since Eve’s available information from
the syndrome is much smaller than that from sequence u1 itself, Alice and
Bob can use u1 as a seed for the key agreement.
First, we need to define some auxiliary random variables. As we have
mentioned in the previous section, we use a function which is more gen-
eral than ζ. Let χA, χB be arbitrary functions from F
2
2 to F2. Then, let
ζA : F
3
2 → F2 be a function defined as ζA(a1, a2, a3) := a1 if χA(a2, a3) = 0,
and ζA(a1, a2, a3) := 0 else. Let ζB : F
3
2 → F2 be a function defined as
ζB(b1, b2, b3) := b1 if χB(b2, b3) = 0, and ζB(b1, b2, b3) := 0 else. By us-
ing these functions and the function ξ defined in the previous section, we
define the auxiliary random variables: U1 := ξ(X1,X2), V1 := ξ(Y1, Y2),
W1 := U1 + V1, U2 := ζA(X2, U1, V1), and V2 := ζB(Y2, U1, V1). These
auxiliary random variables mean that either Alice or Bob’s second bits are
kept or discarded depending on the values of χA(U1, V1) and χB(U1, V1).
The specific form of χA and χB will be given in Section 4.5 so that the
asymptotic key generation rates are maximized.
Our proposed two-way IR procedure is conducted as follows:
(i) Alice calculate u1 and Bob does the same for v1.
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(ii) Alice calculates syndrome t1 = t1(u1) := M1u1, and sends it to Bob
over the public channel.
(iii) Bob decodes (y, t1) into estimate of u1 by a decoder uˆ1 : (F
2
2)
n×Fk12 →
F
n
2 . Then, he calculates wˆ1 = uˆ1 + v1, and sends it to Alice over the
public channel.
(iv) Alice calculates u˜2 by using x, wˆ1, and the function ζA. Bob also
calculates v˜2 by using y, wˆ, and the function ζB.
(v) Alice calculates syndrome t˜A,2 := MA,2u˜2, and sends it to Bob over
the public channel. Bob also calculate syndrome t˜B,2 := MB,2v˜2, and
sends it to Alice over the public channel.
(vi) Bob decodes (y, wˆ1, t˜A,2) into estimate of u2 by using a decoder uˆ2 :
(F22)
n × Fn2 × FkA,22 → Fn2 . Alice also decodes (x, wˆ1, t˜B,2) by using a
decoder vˆ2 : (F
2
2)
n × Fn2 × FkB,22 → Fn2 .
As we mentioned in Section 3.3, the decoding error probability of the
two-way IR procedure have to be universally small for any distribution in
the candidate {PXY,θ : θ ∈ Θ} that are estimated by Alice and Bob. For
this reason, we introduce the concept that a two-way IR procedure is δ-
universally-correct in a similar manner as in Definition 3.3.1:
Definition 4.3.1 We define a two-way IR procedure to be δ-universally-
correct for the class {PXY,θ : θ ∈ Θ} of probability distribution if
P 2nXY,θ({(x,y) : (u1, u˜2, vˆ2) 6= (u1,u2,v2) or
(uˆ1, uˆ2, v˜2) 6= (u1,u2,v2)}) ≤ δ
for any θ ∈ Θ.
An example of a decoder that fulfils the universality is the minimum
entropy decoder. For Step (iii), the minimum entropy decoder is defined by
uˆ1(y, t1) := argmin
u1∈Fn2 :M1u1=t1
H(Pu1y),
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where Pu1y ∈ Pn(F32) is the joint type of the sequence
(u1,y) = ((u11, y11, y12), . . . , (un1, yn1, yn2))
of length n. For Step (vi), the minimum entropy decoder is defined by
uˆ2(y,w1, t2) := argmin
u2∈Fn2 :MA,2u2=tA,2
H(Pu2w1y),
where Pu2w1y ∈ Pn(F42) is the joint type of the sequence
(u2,w1,y) = ((u12, w11, y11, y12), . . . , (un2, wn1, yn1, yn2))
of length n. The minimum entropy decoder for vˆ2 is defined in a similar
manner.
Theorem 4.3.2 [Csi82, Theorem 1] Let r1, rA,1, and rA,2 be real numbers
that satisfy
r1 > min
θ∈Θ
H(U1,θ|Y1,θY2,θ),
rA,2 > min
θ∈Θ
H(U2,θ|W1,θY1,θY2,θ),
and
rB,2 > min
θ∈Θ
H(V2,θ|W1,θX1,θX2,θ),
respectively, where U1,θ = ξ(X1,θ,X2,θ), W1,θ = U1,θ + ξ(Y1,θ, Y2,θ), and
U2,θ = ζ(X2,θ,W1,θ) for the random variables (X1,θ,X2,θ, Y1,θ, Y2,θ) that are
distributed according to P 2XY,θ. Then, for every sufficiently large n, there
exist a k1×n parity check matrix M1, a kA,2×n parity check matrix MA,2,
and a kB,2×n parity check matrix MB,2 such that k1n ≤ r1,
kA,2
n ≤ rA,2, and
kB,2
n ≤ rB,2, and the decoding error probability by the minimum entropy
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decoding satisfies
P 2nXY,θ({(x,y) : (u1, u˜2, vˆ2) 6= (u1,u2,v2) or
(uˆ1, uˆ2, v˜2) 6= (u1,u2,v2)})
≤ e−nE1 + e−nEA,2 + e−nEB,2
for any θ ∈ Θ, where E1, EA,2, EB,2 > 0 are constants that do not depends
on n.
4.4 Security and Asymptotic Key Generation Rate
4.4.1 Sufficient Condition on Key Generation Rate for Se-
cure Key Agreement
In this section, we show how Alice and Bob decide the parameters of the
postprocessing and share a secret key. Then, we show a sufficient condition
on the parameters such that Alice and Bob can share a secure key. We
employ almost the same notations as in Section 3.4.1.
Let us start with the six-state protocol. Instead of the conditional von
Neumann entropy Hρ(X|E), the quantities
Hρ(U1U2V2|W1E1E2) = H(ρU1U2V2W1E1E2)−H(ρW1E1E2) (4.2)
and
Hρ(U2V2|U1W1E1E2) = H(ρU1U2V2W1E1E2)−H(ρU1W1E1E2) (4.3)
play important roles in our postprocessing, where the von Neumann en-
tropies are calculated with respect to the operator ρU1U2V2W1E1E2 derived
from ρ⊗2AB via the measurement and the functions ξ, ζA, ζB . For the ML
estimator ρˆ(z) of ρ ∈ Pc, we set
Hˆz(U1U2V2|W1E1E2) := Hρˆ(z)(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)
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and
Hˆz(U2V2|U1W1E1E2) := Hρˆ(z)(U2V2|U1W1E1E2),
which are the ML estimators of the quantities in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) re-
spectively.
For the BB84 protocol, we similarly set
Hˆz(U1U2V2|W1E1E2) := min
̺∈Pc(ωˆ(z))
H̺(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)
and
Hˆz(U2V2|U1W1E1E2) := min
̺∈Pc(ωˆ(z))
H̺(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)
respectively.
According to the sample bit sequence z, Alice and Bob decide the rate
k1(z)
n ,
kA,2(z)
n , and
kB,2(z)
n of the parity check matrices used in the two-way
IR procedure. Furthermore, they also decide the length ℓ(z) of the finally
distilled key according to the sample bit sequence z. Then, they conduct
the postprocessing as follows.
(i) Alice and Bob undertake the two-way IR procedure of Section 4.3,
and they obtain (u1, u˜2, vˆ2) and (uˆ1, uˆ2, v˜2) respectively.
(ii) Alice and Bob carry out the PA procedure to distill a key pair (sA, sB).
First, Alice randomly chooses a hash function, f : F3n2 → {0, 1}ℓ(z),
from a family of two-universal hash functions, and sends the choice of
f to Bob over the public channel. Then, Alice’s distilled key is sA =
f(u1, u˜2, vˆ2) and Bob’s distilled key is sB = f(uˆ1, uˆ2, v˜2) respectively.
The distilled key pair and Eve’s available information can be described
by a {cccq}-state, ρzSASBCE, where classical system C consists of random
variables T1, T˜A,2, and T˜B,2 that describe the syndromes transmitted in
Steps (ii) and (v) of the two-way IR procedure and random variable F that
describe the choice of the function in the PA procedure. Then, the security
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of the distilled key pair is defined in the same way as in Section 3.4.1, i.e.,
the key pair is said to be ε-secure if Eq. (3.8) is satisfied.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition on k1(z), kA,2(z),
kB,2(z), and ℓ(z) such that the distilled key is secure.
Theorem 4.4.1 For each sample sequence z ∈ Q, assume that the IR
procedure is δ-universally-correct for the class of distributions
{PXY,ρ : ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α}
in the six-state protocol, and for the class of distributions
{PXY,ω : ‖ωˆ(z) − ω‖ ≤ α}
in the BB84 protocol. For each z ∈ Q, if we set
ℓ(z)
2n
<
1
2
max
[
Hˆz(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)− η(α) − k1(z)
n
− kA,2(z)
n
− kB,2(z)
n
,
Hˆz(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)− η(α) − kA,2(z)
n
− kB,2(z)
n
]
− νn, (4.4)
then the distilled key is (ε+3δ+µ(α,m))-secure, where νn := 5
√
log(36/ε2)
n +
2 log(3/ε)
n .
Proof. We only prove the statement for the six-state protocol, because
the statement for the BB84 protocol is proved exactly in the same way
by replacing ρ ∈ Pc with ω ∈ Ω and some other related quantities. The
assertion of the theorem is proved by using Corollary 2.2.14, Lemma 2.2.10,
Lemma 2.1.2, and Eq. (3.4).
For any ρ ∈ Pc, Eq. (3.4) means that ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α with probability
1 − µ(α,m). When ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ > α, the distilled key pair is 1-secure.
For ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤ α, we first assume (proved later) that the dummy key
S := f(U1,U2,V2) is ε-secret under the condition that Eve can access
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(W1, T1, TA,2, TB,2, F,E), i.e.,
1
2
‖ρzSW1T1TA,2TB,2FE − ρz,mixS ⊗ ρzW1T1TA,2TB,2FE‖ ≤ ε. (4.5)
The assumption that the two-way IR procedure is δ-universally-correct im-
plies that wˆ1 = w1, t˜A,2 = tA,2 := MA,2u2, and t˜B,2 = tB,2 :=MB,2v2 with
probability at least 1− δ. Since (u2, u˜2), (v2, vˆ2), (w1, wˆ1), (tA,2, t˜A,2), and
(tB,2, t˜B,2) can be computed from (x,y), by using Lemma 2.1.2, we have
‖ρz
XYU1U˜2Vˆ2Wˆ1T1T˜A,2T˜B,2FE
− ρzXYU1U2V2W1T1TA,2TB,2FE‖ ≤ 2δ.
Since the trace distance does not increase by CP maps, we have
‖ρz
SAW1T1T˜A,2T˜B,2FE
− ρzSW1T1TA,2TB,2FE‖ ≤ 2δ.
Therefore, the statement that the dummy key S is ε-secret implies that the
actual key SA is (ε+ 2δ)-secret as follows:
‖ρz
SAWˆ1T1T˜A,2T˜B,2FE
− ρz,mixSA ⊗ ρzWˆ1T1T˜2,AT˜2,BFE‖
≤ ‖ρz
SAWˆ1T1T˜A,2T˜B,2FE
− ρzSW1T1TA,2TB,2FE‖
+‖ρzSW1T1TA,2TB,2FE − ρz,mixS ⊗ ρzW1T1TA,2TB,2FE‖
+‖ρz,mixS ⊗ ρzW1T1TA,2TB,2FE − ρz,mixSA ⊗ ρzWˆ1T1T˜A,2T˜B,2FE‖,
where the first term is upper bounded by 2δ, the second term is upper
bounded by 2ε, and the third term is also upper bounded by 2δ because
ρz,mixS = ρ
z,mix
SA
. The assumption that the two-way IR procedure is δ-
universally-correct also implies that the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is δ-
universally-correct. Thus, the key pair is (ε + 3δ)-secure if ‖ρˆ(z) − ρ‖ ≤
α. Averaging over the sample sequence z ∈ Q, the distilled key pair is
(ε+ 3δ + µ(α,m))-secure.
One thing we have left is to prove Eq. (4.5). According to Lemma 2.2.10,
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the inequality
ℓ(z)
2n
<
1
2
[
Hˆz(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)− η(α)− k1(z)
n
− kA,2(z)
n
− kB,2(z)
n
]
− νn
implies the inequality
ℓ(z) <
H ε¯min(ρU1U2V2W1E|W1E)− k1(z) − kA,2(z)− kB,2(z)− 2 log(3/2ε).
Thus, Corollary 2.2.14 implies that the dummy key S is ε-secret.
Since the syndrome T1 is computed from the sequence U1, if the dummy
key S is ε-secret in the case that Eve can access the sequence U1, then the
dummy key S must be ε-secret in the case that Eve can only access the
syndrome T1 instead of U1. According to Lemma 2.2.10, the inequality
ℓ(z)
2n
<
1
2
[
Hˆz(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)− η(α) − kA,2(z)
n
− kB,2(z)
n
]
− νn
implies the inequality
ℓ(z) < H ε¯min(ρU1U2V2W1E|U1W1E)− kA,2(z) − kB,2(z) − 2 log(3/2ε).
Thus, Corollary 2.2.14 implies that the dummy key S is ε-secret.
Combining above two arguments, we have the assertion of the theorem.

Remark 4.4.2 The maximization in Eq. (4.4) is very important. If either
of them is omitted, the key generation rate of the postprocessing can be
underestimated, as will be discussed in Section 4.5.
Remark 4.4.3 By switching the role of Alice and Bob, we obtain a post-
processing with the reverse two-way IR procedure. For the postprocess-
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ing with the reverse two-way IR procedure, we can show almost the same
statement as Theorem 4.4.1 by replacing U1 with V1, and by using the
δ-universally-correct for the reverse two-way IR procedure.
4.4.2 Asymptotic Key Generation Rates
In this section, we derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula for the
postprocessing with the two-way IR procedure. First, we consider the six-
state protocol. Since the ML estimator is a consistent estimator, in a similar
arguments as in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3, we can set the sequence of the key
generation rates so that it converges to the asymptotic key generation rate
formula
1
2
max [Hρ(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)−Hρ(U1|Y1Y2)
−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hρ(V2|W1X1X2),
Hρ(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hρ(V2|W1X1X2)] (4.6)
in probability as m,n→∞. We can also derive the asymptotic key genera-
tion formula for the postprocessing with the reverse two-way IR procedure
as
1
2
max [Hρ(V1U2V2|W1E1E2)−Hρ(V1|X1X2)
−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hρ(V2|W1X1X2),
Hρ(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hρ(V2|W1X1X2)] . (4.7)
Next, we consider the BB84 protocol. Since the ML estimator is a
consistent estimator, in a similar arguments as in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.4,
we can set the sequence of the key generation rates so that it converges to
the asymptotic key generation rate formula
1
2
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
max [H̺(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)−Hω(U1|Y1Y2)
−Hω(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hω(V2|W1X1X2),
H̺(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)−Hω(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hω(V2|W1X1X2)] , (4.8)
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in probability as m,n→∞.
We can also derive the asymptotic key generation rate formula for the
postprocessing with the reverse two-way IR procedure as
1
2
min
̺∈Pc(ω)
max [H̺(V1U2V2|W1E1E2)−Hω(U1|X1X2)
−Hω(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hω(V2|W1X1X2),
H̺(V2|U1W1E1E2)−Hω(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hω(V2|W1X1X2)] . (4.9)
The following propositions are useful to calculate the minimizations in
Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9).
Proposition 4.4.4 For two density operator ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Pc and a probabilis-
tically mixture ρ′ := λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2, Eve’s ambiguities are convex, i.e., we
have
Hρ′(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)
≤ λHρ1(U1U2V2|W1E1E2) + (1− λ)Hρ2(U1U2V2|W1E1E2)
and
Hρ′(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)
≤ λHρ1(U2V2|U1W1E1E2) + (1− λ)Hρ2(U2V2|U1W1E1E2),
where ρ′U1U2V2W1E1E2 is the density operator derived from a purification
(ψ′ABE)
⊗2 of (ρ′AB)
⊗2.
Proof. The statement of this proposition is shown exactly in the same way
as Proposition 3.4.7. 
Proposition 4.4.5 For the BB84 protocol, the minimization in Eqs. (4.8)
and (4.9) is achieved by Choi operator ̺ whose components Rzy, Rxy, Ryz,
Ryx, and ty, are all 0.
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Proof. The statement of this proposition is shown exactly in the same way
as Proposition 3.4.9 by using Proposition 4.4.4. 
Remark 4.4.6 By using the chain rule of von Neumann entropy, we can
rewrite Eq. (4.6) as
1
2
{max[Hρ(U1|W1E1E2)−H(U1,ρ|Y1,ρY2,ρ), 0]
+Hρ(U2V2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)−Hρ(V2|W1X1X2)}. (4.10)
We can interpret this formula as follows. If Bob’s ambiguity Hρ(U1|Y1Y2)
about bit U1 is smaller than Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(U1|W1E1E2) about U1,
then Eve cannot decode sequence U1 [SW73, DW03], and there exists some
remaining ambiguity about bit U1 for Eve. We can thus distill some secure
key from bit U1. On the other hand, if Bob’s ambiguity Hρ(U1|Y1Y2) about
bit U1, i.e., the amount of transmitted syndrome per bit, is larger than
Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(U1|W1E1E2) about U1, then Eve might be able to de-
code sequence U1 from her side information and the transmitted syndrome
[SW73, DW03]. Thus, there exists the possibility that Eve can completely
know bit U1, and we can distill no secure key from bit U1, because we have
to consider the worst case in a cryptography scenario. Consequently, send-
ing the compressed version (syndrome) of sequence U1 instead of U1 itself
is not always effective, and the slope of the key rate curves change when
Eve becomes able to decode U1 (see Figs. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5).
A similar argument also holds for the BB84 protocol.
Remark 4.4.7 If we take the functions χA and χB as
χA(a1, a2) :=
{
0 if a1 = a2
1 else
(4.11)
and
χB(b1, b2) = 1. (4.12)
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Then, the postprocessing proposed in this thesis reduces to the postprocess-
ing proposed in [WMUK07].
Remark 4.4.8 The asymptotic key generation rate (for the six-state pro-
tocol) of the postprocessing with the advantage distillation is given by
1
2
[Hρ(U2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)], (4.13)
where the auxiliary random variables U1, U2,W1 are defined as in Section
4.2, or they are defined by using the functions χA, χB given in Eqs. (4.11)
and (4.12). From Eqs. (4.6) and (4.13), we can find that the asymptotic key
generation rate of the proposed postprocessing is at least as high as that of
the postprocessing with the advantage distillation if we employ appropriate
functions χA, χB .
A similar argument also holds for the BB84 protocol.
Remark 4.4.9 In [GA08], Gohari and Anantharam proposed2 a two-way
postprocessing which is similar to our proposed two-way postprocessing.
They derived the asymptotic key generation rate formula of their proposed
postprocessing. Although their postprocessing seems to be a generaliza-
tion of our proposed postprocessing, the asymptotic key generation rate
(Eq. (4.6)) of our proposed postprocessing cannot be derived by their asymp-
totic key generation rate formula. By modifying their formula for the QKD
protocol, we can only derive the asymptotic key generation rate
1
2
[Hρ(U1|E1E2)−Hρ(U1|Y1Y2)
+Hρ(W1|U1E1E2)−Hρ(W1|U1X1X2)
+Hρ(U2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|U1W1Y1Y2)
+Hρ(V2|U1W1U2E1E2)−Hρ(V2|U1W1U2X1X2)]. (4.14)
For a Pauli channel, sinceW1 is independent from (X1,X2) andHρ(W1|E1E2) =
2It should be noted that they consider the classical key agreement problem instead of
the postprocessing of the QKD protocol. However, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, they
are essentially the same.
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0, Eq. (4.14) is strictly smaller than Eq. (4.6).
The underestimation of the asymptotic key generation rate comes from
the following reason. In Gohari and Anantharam’s postprocessing, a syn-
drome of w1 is transmitted over the public channel, and the length of the
syndrome is roughly Hρ(W1|U1X1X2). When the syndrome is transmitted
over the public channel, Eve cannot obtain more information than w1 itself.
The lack of this observation results into Eq. (4.14).
4.5 Comparison of Asymptotic Key Generation
Rates for Specific Channels
In this section, we compare the asymptotic key generation rates of the
proposed postprocessing, the postprocessing with the advantage distillation,
the one-way postprocessing for representative specific channels.
4.5.1 Pauli Channel
When the channel between Alice and Bob is a Pauli channel, the Stokes
parameterization of the corresponding density operator ρ ∈ Pc is




ez 0 0
0 ex 0
0 0 ey

 ,


0
0
0



 , (4.15)
for −1 ≤ ez, ex, ey ≤ 1. The Choi operator of the Pauli channel is a Bell
diagonal state:
ρ =
∑
k,l∈F2
PKL(k, l)|ψ(k, l)〉〈ψ(k, l)|, (4.16)
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where PKL is a distribution on F2 × F2 defined by
PKL(0, 0) =
1+ez+ex+ey
4 ,
PKL(0, 1) =
1+ez−ex−ey
4 ,
PKL(1, 0) =
1−ez+ex−ey
4 ,
PKL(1, 1) =
1−ez−ex+ey
4 ,
(4.17)
and
|ψ(0, 0)〉 := |00〉 + |11〉√
2
,
|ψ(1, 0)〉 := |01〉 + |10〉√
2
,
|ψ(0, 1)〉 := |00〉 − |11〉√
2
,
|ψ(1, 1)〉 := |01〉 − |10〉√
2
.
We occasionally abbreviate PKL(k, l) as pkl. Note that the Pauli channel is
a special class of the unital channel discussed in Section 3.6.2.
The following lemma simplify the calculation of Eq. (4.8) for a Pauli
channel.
Lemma 4.5.1 For a Bell diagonal Choi operator ρ, the minimizations in
Eqs. (4.8) (4.9) are achieved by a Bell diagonal operator ̺ ∈ Pc(ω).
Proof. This lemma is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4.4.4. 
Lemma 4.5.2 For Bell diagonal state ρ, the asymptotic key generation rate
is maximized when we employ the functions χA, χB given by Eqs. (4.11) and
(4.12).
Proof. Since Hρ(X2|W1 = 1, Y1Y2) = 1 and Hρ(X2|W1 = 1, E1E2) ≤ 1, X2
should be discarded if W1 = 1. Similarly, Y2 should be discarded if W1 = 0.
Since the Bell diagonal Choi operator is symmetric with respect to Alice
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and Bob’s subsystem, we have
Hρ(X2|W1 = 0, U1E1E2) = Hρ(Y2|W1 = 0, U1E1E2),
and
Hρ(X2|W1 = 0, Y1Y2) = Hρ(Y2|W1 = 0,X1X2).
Furthermore, we have
Hρ(Y2|W1 = 0, U1X2E1E2) ≤ Hρ(Y2|W1 = 0,X1X2). (4.18)
Therefore, the functions given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) are optimal. Note
that Eq. (4.18) means that we should not keep Y2 if we keep X2. 
By Lemmas 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, it suffice to consider the functions given
by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) if the channel is a Pauli channel. Therefore, we
employ the functions given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) throughout this subsec-
tion. Furthermore, we can find that the asymptotic key generation rates for
the direct and the reverse IR procedure coincide, becauseHρ(U1|W1E1E2) =
Hρ(V1|W1E1E2) and Hρ(U1|Y1Y2) = Hρ(V1|X1X2). Therefore, we only
consider the asymptotic key generation rate for the direct IR procedure
throughout this subsection.
Theorem 4.5.3 For a Bell diagonal state ρ, we have
1
2
max [Hρ(U1U2|W1E1E2)−Hρ(U1|Y1Y2)
−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2),
Hρ(U2|U1W1E1E2)−Hρ(U2|W1Y1Y2)] ,
= max[1−H(PKL)
+
PK¯(1)
2
h
(
p00p10 + p01p11
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
)
,
PK¯(0)
2
(1−H(P ′KL))], (4.19)
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where
PK¯(0) := (p00 + p01)
2 + (p10 + p11)
2,
PK¯(1) := 2(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11),
and
P ′KL(0, 0) :=
p200 + p
2
01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′KL(1, 0) :=
2p00p01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′KL(0, 1) :=
p210 + p
2
11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′KL(1, 1) :=
2p10p11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
.
The theorem is proved by a straightforward calculation, and the proof is
presented at the end of this section.
Combining Lemma 4.5.1, Theorem 4.5.3, and Eq (4.17), it is straight-
forward to calculate the asymptotic key generation rate for a Pauli chan-
nel. As a special case of the Pauli channel, we consider the depolarizing
channel. The depolarizing channel is parameterized by one real parameter
e ∈ [0, 1/2], and the Bell diagonal entries of the Choi operator are given
by p00 = 1 − 3e/2, p10 = p01 = p11 = e/2. For the six-state protocol, it
is straightforward to calculate the asymptotic key generation rate, which
is plotted in Fig. 4.1. According to Lemma 4.5.1, it is sufficient to take
the minimization over the subset Pc,Bell(ω) ⊂ Pc(ω) that consists of all
Bell diagonal operators in Pc(ω). For the depolarizing channel, the set
Pc,Bell(ω) consists of Bell diagonal state ̺ =
∑
k,l∈F2
p′kl|ψ(k, l)〉〈ψ(k, l)| sat-
isfying p′00 = 1 − e + κ, p′10 = p′11 = e/2 − κ, and p′11 = κ for κ ∈ [0, e/2].
We can calculate the asymptotic key generation rate by taking the mini-
mum with respect to the one free parameter κ ∈ [0, e/2], which is plotted
in Fig. 4.2.
It should be noted that the asymptotic key generation rate of the stan-
dard one-way postprocessing [SP00, Lo01] is 1 − H(PKL) for the six-state
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protocol and minκ[1−H(PKL)] for the BB84 protocol. Therefore, Eq. (4.19)
analytically clarifies that the asymptotic key generation rate of our post-
processing is at least as high as that of the standard postprocessing.
Proof of Theorem 4.5.3
Let
|ψABE〉 :=
∑
k,l∈F2
√
PKL(k, l)|ψ(k, l)〉|k, l〉
=
∑
x,k∈F2
√
PK(k)|x, x+ k〉|φ(x, k)〉
be a purification of ρ =
∑
k,l∈F2
|ψ(k, l)〉〈ψ(k, l)|, where we set
|φ(x, k)〉 := 1√
PK(k)
∑
l∈F2
(−1)xl
√
PKL(k, l)|k, l〉,
and where PK(k) =
∑
l∈F2
PKL(k, l) is a marginal distribution. Then, let
ρX1X2Y1Y2E1E2
=
∑
~x,~k∈F22
1
4
P 2K(
~k)|~x, ~x+~k〉〈~x, ~x+~k| ⊗ ρ~x,~kE1E2 ,
where
ρ~x,
~k
E1E2
:= |φ(x1, k1)〉〈φ(x1, k1)| ⊗ |φ(x2, k2)〉〈φ(x2, k2)|
for ~x = (x1, x2) and ~k = (k1, k2).
Note that H(U1|Y1Y2) = H(W1) for the Pauli channel. Let W2 be a
random variable defined by W2 := ξ2(W1, Y2) + U2. Then, for the Pauli
channel, we have H(U2|W1Y1Y2) = PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0).
Noting that
PX1X2Y1Y2(~x, ~x+
~k) =
1
4
P 2K(
~k),
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates of the six-
state protocols. “Two-way” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the
proposed postprocessing. “Vollbrecht et al.” is the asymptotic key genera-
tion rate of the two-way postprocessing of [MFD+06, WMU06]. “Advantage
Distillation” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing
with the advantage distillation [GL03]. “One-way” is the asymptotic key
generation rate of the one-way postprocessing [RGK05]. It should be noted
that the asymptotic key generation rates of the six-state protocols with the
advantage distillation in [Ren05, GL03, Cha02, BA07] are slightly higher
than that of the proposed protocol for much higher error rate.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates of the BB84
protocols. “Two-way” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the proposed
postprocessing. “Vollbrecht et al.” is the asymptotic key generation rate
of the two-way postprocessing of [MFD+06, WMU06]. “Advantage Distil-
lation” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing with the
advantage distillation [GL03]. “One-way” is the asymptotic key generation
rate of the one-way postprocessing [RGK05].
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we have
PU1(u1) =
1
2
PW1(w1) =
∑
~k∈F22
k1+k2=w1
P 2K(
~k)
PU2|W1=0(u2) =
1
2
PU2|W1=1(u2) = 1
PW2|W1=0(w2) =
P 2K(w2, w2)
PW1(w1)
PW2|W1=1(0) = 1.
Using these formulas, we can write
ρU1U2W1E1E2 =
∑
~u∈F22
∑
w1∈F2
PU1(u1)PW1(w1)
PU2|W1=w1(u2)|~u,w1〉〈~u,w1| ⊗ ρ¯~u,w1E1E2
for ~u = (u1, u2), where
ρ¯~u,w1E1E2 :=
∑
w2∈F2
PW2|W1=0(w2)ρ
~uG,(w1,w2)G
E1E2
for w1 = 0 and a matrix G =
(
1 1
1 0
)
, and
ρ¯~u,w1E1E2 :=
∑
a,b∈F2
1
4
ρ
(u1,a)G,(w1,b)G
E1E2
for w1 = 1.
Since supports of rank 1 matrices {ρ~x,~kE1E2}~k∈F22 are orthogonal to each
other, ρ~u,w1E1E2 for w1 = 0 is already eigen value decomposed. Applying
Lemma 4.5.4 for J = {00, 10} and C = C⊥ = {00, 11}, we can eigen value
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decompose ρ~u,w1E1E2 for w1 = 1 as
ρ~u,w1E1E2 =
∑
b∈F2
1
2
∑
~j∈J
P
J|~K=~k
(~j)|ϑ((u1, 0), k,~j)〉〈ϑ((u1, 0), k,~j)|,
where we follow the notations in Lemma 4.5.4 for m = 2.
Thus, we have
H(ρU1U2W1E1E2)
= H(PU1) +H(PW1) +
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1){H(PU2|W1=w1)
+
∑
~u∈F22
PU1(u1)PU2|W1=w1(u2)H(ρ
~u,w1
E1E2
)}
= 1 +H(PK¯) + PK¯(0){1 +H(P~K|K¯=0)}
+ PK¯(1)H(P~KJ|K¯=1). (4.20)
Taking the partial trace of ρU1U2W1E1E2 over systems U1, U2, we have
ρW1E1E2 =
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1)|w1〉〈w1|
⊗

∑
~u∈F22
PU1PU2|W1=w1(u2)ρ¯
~u,w1
E1E2

 .
Thus, we have
H(ρW1E1E2) = H(PW1) +
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1)
H

∑
~u∈F22
PU1PU2|W1=w1(u2)ρ¯
~u,w1
E1E2


= H(PK¯) +
∑
k¯∈F2
PK¯(0)H(P~K~L|K¯=k¯). (4.21)
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Combining Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21), we have
Hρ(U1U2|W1E1E2)−H(U1|Y1Y2)−H(U2|U1W1Y1Y2)
= Hρ(U1U2|W1E1E2)−H(PW1)− PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0)
= 2−H(P~K~L) + PK¯(1){H(P~KJ|K¯=1)− 1}
= 2− 2H(PKL) + PK¯(1)h
(
p00p10 + p01p11
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
)
.
On the other hand, by taking partial trace of ρU1U2W1E1E2 over the
system U1, we have
ρU1W1E1E2 =
∑
u1,w1∈F2
1
2
PW1(w1)|u1, w1〉〈u1, w1|
⊗

 ∑
u2∈F2
PU2|W1=w1(u2)ρ
(u1,u2),w1
E1E2

 .
Thus, we have
H(ρU1W1E1E2) = 1 +H(PW1) +
∑
u1,w1∈F2
1
2
PW1(w1)
H

 ∑
u2∈F2
PU2|W1=w1(u2)ρ
(u1,u2),w1
E1E2


= 1 +H(PK¯) +
∑
k¯∈F2
PK¯(k¯)H(P~KJ|K¯=1).
(4.22)
Combining Eqs. (4.20) and (4.22), we have
Hρ(U2|W1U1E1E2)−H(U2|W1U1E1E2)
= Hρ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0)
= PK¯(0)(1 −H(P ′KL)).

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Lemma 4.5.4 Let C be a linear subspace of Fm2 . Let
|ϕm(~x,~k)〉 := 1√
Pm
K
(~k)
∑
~l∈Fm2
(−1)~x·~l
√
PmKL(
~k,~l)|~k,~l〉,
and ρ~x,
~k
Em := |ϕm(~x,~k)〉〈ϕm(~x,~k)|. Let J be a set of coset representatives of
the cosets Fm2 /C, and
P
J|Km=~k
(~j) :=
∑
~c∈C⊥ P
m
KL(
~k,~j+~c)
PmK (
~k)
be conditional probability distributions on J. Then, for any ~a ∈ Fm2 , we
have
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|ρ
~x+~a,~k
Em =
∑
~j∈J
P
J|Km=~k
(~j)|ϑ(~a,~k,~j)〉〈ϑ(~a,~k,~j)|, (4.23)
where
|ϑ(~a,~k,~j)〉 := 1√∑
~e∈C⊥ P
m
KL(
~k,~j+~e)∑
~c∈C⊥
(−1)~a·~c
√
PmKL(
~k,~j+~c)|~k,~j+~c〉.
Remark 4.5.5 If ~j 6=~i, obviously we have 〈ϑ(~a,~k,~j)|ϑ(~a,~k,~i)〉 = 0. Thus,
the right hand side of Eq. (4.23) is an eigen value decomposition. Moreover,
if ~a+~b ∈ C, then we have |ϑ(~a,~k,~j)〉 = |ϑ(~b,~k,~j)〉.
Proof. For any ~x ∈ C and ~a ∈ Fm2 , we can rewrite
|ϕ(~x + ~a,~k)〉 = 1√
Pm
K
(~k)
∑
~j∈J
∑
~c∈C⊥
(−1)(~x+~a)·(~j+~c)
√
Pm
KL
(~k,~j+~c)|~k,~j+~c〉
4.5. Comparison of Asymptotic Key Generation Rates for Specific
Channels 101
=
∑
~j∈J
(−1)(~x+~a)·~j
√
P
J|Km=~k
(~j)|ϑ(~a,~k,~j)〉.
Then, we have
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|ρ
~x+~a,~k
Em
=
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|
∑
~i,~j∈J
(−1)(~x+~a)·(~i+~j)
√
P
J|Km=~k
(~i)P
J|Km=~k
(~j)
|ϑ(~a,~k,~i)〉〈ϑ(~a,~k,~j)|
=
∑
~i,~j∈J
(−1)~a·(~i+~j)
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|(−1)
~x·(~i+~j)
√
P
J|Km=~k
(~i)P
J|Km=~k
(~j)
|ϑ(~a,~k,~i)〉〈ϑ(~a,~k,~j)|
=
∑
~j∈J
P
J|Km=~k
(~j)|ϑ(~a,~k,~j)〉〈ϑ(~a,~k,~j)|,
where · is the standard inner product on the vector space Fm2 , and we used
the following equality,
∑
~x∈C
(−1)~x·(~i+~j) = 0
for~i 6=~j. 
4.5.2 Unital Channel
In this section, we calculate the asymptotic key generation rates for the
Unital channel. Although we succeeded to show a closed formula of the
asymptotic key generation rate for the Pauli channel, which is a special class
of the unital channel, in Section 4.5.1, we do not know any closed formula
of the asymptotic key generation rate for the unital channel in general.
For the six-state protocol, it is straightforward to numerically calculate
the asymptotic key generation rate. For the BB84 protocol, owing to Propo-
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sition 4.4.5, the asymptotic key generation rate can be calculated by taking
the minimization over one free parameter Ryy.
As an example of non Pauli but unital channel, we numerically calculated
asymptotic key generation rates for the depalarizing channel whose axis is
rotated by π/4, i.e., the channel whose Stokes parameterization is given by




cos(π/4) − sin(π/4) 0
sin(π/4) cos(π/4) 0
0 0 1




1− 2e 0 0
0 1− 2e 0
0 0 1− 2e

 ,


0
0
0



 .(4.24)
For this channel, since the Choi operator is symmetric with respect to
Alice and Bob’s subsystem, we can also show that the asymptotic key gen-
eration rate is maximized when we employ the functions χA, χB given by
Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) in a similar manner as Lemma 4.5.2. Therefore, we
employ the functions given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) throughout this subsec-
tion. Furthermore, we can find that the asymptotic key generation rates for
the direct and the reverse IR procedure coincide, becauseHρ(U1|W1E1E2) =
Hρ(V1|W1E1E2) and Hρ(U1|Y1Y2) = Hρ(V1|X1X2). Therefore, we only
consider the asymptotic key generation rate for the direct IR procedure
throughout this subsection.
For the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol, the asymptotic key
generation rate of the postprocessing with the two-way IR procedure and
that of the postprocessing with the one-way IR procedure are compared in
Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 respectively. We find that the asymptotic key gener-
ation rates of the postprocessing with our proposed two-way IR procedure
is higher than those of the one-way postprocessing, which suggest that our
proposed IR procedure is effective not only for the Pauli channel, but also
for non-Pauli channels. It should be noted that the asymptotic key genera-
tion rates of the postprocessing with the direct one-way IR procedure and
the reverse one-way IR procedure coincide for this example.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates of the BB84
protocol. “Two-way” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the postpro-
cessing with two-way IR procedure (Eq. (4.8)). “One-way” is the asymp-
totic key generation rate of the postprocessing with one-way IR procedure
(Eq. (3.15)).
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates of the
six-state protocol. “Two-way” is the asymptotic key generation rate of
the postprocessing with two-way IR procedure (Eq. (4.6)). “One-way” is
the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing with one-way IR
procedure (Eq. (3.12)).
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4.5.3 Amplitude Damping Channel
In this section, we calculate the asymptotic key generation rates (for the
direct two-way IR procedure and the reverse two-way IR procedure) for the
amplitude damping channel. Although we succeeded to derive a closed for-
mulae of the asymptotic key generation rates of the one-way postprocessing
in Section 3.6.1, we do not know any closed formula of the asymptotic key
generation rates of the postprocessing with the two-way IR procedure for
the amplitude damping channel. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the
asymptotic key generation rate is maximized when we employ the functions
given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12). Therefore, we (numerically) optimize the
choice of the functions χA, χB so that the asymptotic key generation rate
is maximized.
Since the set Pc(ω) consists of only ρ itself for both the BB84 protocol
(refer Section 3.6.1), we can easily conduct the numerical calculation of the
asymptotic key generation rates for the six-state protocol and the BB84 pro-
tocol. The asymptotic key generation rates of the postprocessing with the
direct two-way IR procedure, the reverse two-way IR procedure, the direct
one-way IR procedure, and the reverse one-way IR procedure are compared
in Fig. 4.5. It should be noted that the asymptotic key generation rates for
the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol coincide in this example. We
numerically found that the functions given by χA(a1, a2) := 1 and
χB(a1, a2) =
{
0 if a1 = a2
1 else
maximizes the asymptotic key generation rates for both the direct two-way
IR procedure and the reverse IR procedure.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the asymptotic key generation rates. “Two-
way (reverse)” is the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing
with reverse two-way IR procedure (Eq. (4.7)). “One-way (reverse)” is
the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing with reverse one-
way IR procedure (Eq. (3.13)). “Two-way (direct)” is the asymptotic key
generation rate of the postprocessing with direct two-way IR procedure
(Eq. (4.6)). “Two-way (non-optimal)” is the asymptotic key generation rate
of the postprocessing with direct two-way IR procedure when we employ
the functions χA, χB given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12). “One-way (direct)” is
the asymptotic key generation rate of the postprocessing with one-way IR
procedure (Eq. (3.12)).
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4.6 Relation to Entanglement Distillation Proto-
col
As is mentioned in Chapter 1, the security of the QKD protocols have been
studied by using the quantum error correcting code and the entanglement
distillation protocol (EDP) since Shor and Preskill found the relation be-
tween them [SP00]. The crucial point in Shor and Preskill’s proof is to
find an EDP that corresponds to a postprocessing of the QKD protocols.
Indeed, the security of the QKD protocols with the two-way classical com-
munication [GL03] was proved by finding the corresponding EDPs.
We will explain the EDP proposed by Vollbrecht and Vestraete [VV05] in
this section. Then, we present the postprocesing3 of the QKD protocols that
corresponds to Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s EDP. Furthermore, we compare
the posptocessing (corresponding to Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s EDP) and
the postprocessing shown in Section 4.4, and clarify the relation between
them, where we employ the functions given by Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12). The
comparison result suggests4 that there exists no EDP that corresponds to
the postprocessing shown in Section 4.4.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share 2n pairs bipartite qubits systems, and
the state of each bipartite system is a Bell diagonal state5
ρ =
∑
k,l∈F2
PKL(k, l)|ψ(k, l)〉〈ψ(k, l)|. (4.25)
The EDP is a protocol to distill the mixed entangled state ρ⊗2n into the
maximally entangled state |ψ〉⊗ℓ by using the local operation and the clas-
sical communication [BDSW96].
Vollbrecht and Vestraete proposed the following EDP [VV05], where it
3The postprocessing presented in this section is a modified version of the postprocessing
presented in [MFD+06, WMU06] so that it fit into the notations in this thesis.
4Renner et al. suggested that there exist no EDP which corresponds to the noisy
preprocessing (see Remark 3.4.6) proposed by themselves.
5There is an entanglement distillation protocol that works for bipartite states that are
not necessarily Bell diagonal states [DW05]. However, we only consider EDPs for the Bell
diagonal states.
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is slightly modified (essentially the same) from the original version because
we want to clarify the relation among this EDP, the corresponding postpro-
cessing, and the postprocessing shown in Section 4.4.
(i) Alice and Bob divide 2n pairs of the bipartite systems into n blocks of
length 2, and locally carry out the controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation
on each block, where the 2ith pair is the source and the (2i − 1)th
pair is the target.
(ii) Then, Alice and Bob undertake the breeding protocol [BBP+96] to
guess bit-flip errors in the (2i−1)th pair for all i. The guessed bit-flip
errors can be described by a sequence wˆ1 (Note that two-way classical
communication is used in this step).
(iii) According to wˆ1, Alice and Bob classify indices of blocks into two sets
T0 := {i : wˆi = 0} and T1 := {i : wˆi = 1}.
(iv) For a collection of 2ith pairs such that i ∈ T0, Alice and Bob conduct
the breeding protocol to correct bit-flip errors.
(v) For a collection of 2ith pairs such that i ∈ T1, Alice and Bob perform
measurements in the z-basis, and obtain measurement results x2,T1
and y2,T1 respectively.
(vi) Alice sends x2,T1 to Bob.
(vii) Alice and Bob correct the phase errors for the remaining pairs by using
information T0, T1, and the bit-flip error x2,T1 + y2,T1 .
The yield of this EDP is given by
1−H(PKL) + PK¯(1)
4
{
h
(
p01
p00 + p01
)
+ h
(
p11
p10 + p11
)}
. (4.26)
We can find by the concavity of the binary entropy function that the first
argument in the maximum of the r.h.s. of Eq. (4.19) is larger than the value
in Eq. (4.26).
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If we convert this EDP into a postprocessing of the QKD protocols,
the difference between that postprocessing and ours is as follows. In the
postprocessing converted from the EDP [VV05], after Step (iv), Alice reveals
the sequence, x2,Tˆ1 , which consists of the second bit, xi2, of the ith block
such that the parity of discrepancies wˆi1 is 1. However, Alice discards x2,Tˆ1
in the proposed IR protocol of Section 4.3. Since sequence x2,Tˆ1 has some
correlation to sequence u1 from the view point of Eve, Alice should not
reveal x2,Tˆ1 to achieve a higher key generation rate.
In the EDP context, on the other hand, since the bit flip error, x2,Tˆ1 +
y2,Tˆ1
, has some correlation to the phase flip errors in the (2i−1)-th pair with
i ∈ Tˆ1, Alice should send the measurement results, x2,Tˆ1 , to Bob. If Alice
discards measurement results x2,Tˆ1 without telling Bob what the result is,
then the yield of the resulting EDP is worse than Eq. (4.26). Consequently,
there seems to be no correspondence between the EDP and our proposed
classical processing.
4.7 Summary
The results in this chapter is summarized as follows: In Section 4.2, we
reviewed the advantage distillation. In Section 4.3, we proposed the two-
way IR procedure. In Section 4.4, we derived a sufficient condition on the
key generation rate such that a secure key agreement is possible with our
proposed postprocessing (Theorem 4.4.1). We also derived the asymptotick
key generation rate formulae.
In Section 4.5, we investigated the asymptotic key generation rate of our
proposed postprocessing. Especially in Section 4.5.1, we derived a closed
form of the asymptotic key generation rate for the Pauli channel (Theorem
4.5.3), which clarifies that the asymptotic key generation rate of our pro-
posed postprocessing is at least as high as the asymptotic key generation
rate of the standard postprocessing. We also numerically clarified that the
asymptotic key generation rate of our proposed postprocessing is higher
than the asymptotic key generation rate of any other postprocessing for the
Pauli channel (Section 4.5.1), the unital channel (Section 4.5.2), and the
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amplitude damping channel (Section 4.5.3) respectively.
Finally in Section 4.6, we clarified the relation between our proposed
postprocessing and the EDP proposed by Vollbrecht and Vestraete [VV05].
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we investigated the channel estimation phase and the post-
processing phase of the QKD protocols. The contribution of this thesis is
summarized as follows.
For the channel estimation phase, we proposed a new channel estima-
tion procedure in which we use the mismatched measurement outcomes in
addition to the samples from the matched measurement outcomes. We clar-
ified that the key generation rate decided according to our proposed channel
estimation procedure is at least as high as the key generation rate decided
according to the conventional channel estimation procedure. We also clar-
ified that the former is strictly higher than the latter for the amplitude
damping channel and the unital channel.
For the postprocessing phase, we proposed a new kind of postprocess-
ing procedure with two-way public communication. For the Pauli channel,
we clarified that the key generation rate of the QKD protocols with our
proposed postprocessing is higher than the key generation rate of the QKD
protocols with the standard one-way postprocessing. For the Pauli chan-
nel, the amplitude damping channel, and the unital channel, we numerically
clarified that the QKD protocols with our proposed postprocessing is higher
than the key generation rate of the QKD protocols with any other postpro-
cessing.
There are some problems that should be investigated in a future.
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• To show the necessary and sufficient condition on the channel for that
the (asymptotic) key generation rate decided according our proposed
channel estimation procedure is strictly higher than that decided ac-
cording to the conventional channel estimation procedure for the six-
state protocol.
• To analytically show that the (asymptotic) key generation rate of our
proposed two-way postprocessing is at least as high as that of the
standard one-way postprocessing, or to find a counter example.
Appendix A
Notations
Notations first appeared in Chapter 2
P(X ) the set of all probability distributions on the set X
PX , PXY probability distributions
Px the type of the sequence x
P(H) the set of all density operators on the quantum sys-
tem H
P ′(H) the set of all non-negative operators on H
ρ, ρAB density operators
‖ · ‖ the trace distance (variational distance)
F (·, ·) the fidelity
H(X) the entropy of the random variable X
H(PX) the entropy of the random variable with the distri-
bution PX
h(·) the binary entropy function
H(X|Y ) the (Shannon) conditional entropy of X given Y
I(X;Y ) the mutual information between X and Y
H(ρ) the von Neumann entropy of the system whose
state is ρ
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Hρ(A|B) the conditional von Neumann entropy of the system
A conditioned by the system B
Iρ(A;B) the quantum mutual information between the sys-
tems A and B
σx, σy, σz the Pauli operators
|ψ〉 the maximally entangled state defined in Eq. (2.6)
Pc the set of all Choi operators
(R, t) the Stokes parameterization of the channel
Hmin(ρAB |σB) the min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hmax(ρAB |σB) the max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hεmin(ρAB |B) the ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB given the system
B
Hεmax(ρAB |B) the ε-smooth max-entropy of ρAB given the system
B
Bε(ρ) the set of all operators ρ¯ ∈ P ′(H) such that ‖ρ¯ −
ρ‖ ≤ Tr[ρ]ε
d(ρAB |B) the distance from the uniform (see Definition
2.2.11)
Notations first appeared in Chapter 3
|0a〉, |1a〉 the eigenstates of the Pauli operator σa
ρXYE the {ccq}-state describing Alice and Bob’s bit se-
quences (X,Y) and the state in Eve’s system
M the parity check matrix
t the syndrome
PXY the probability distribution of Alice and Bob’s bits
PW the probability distribution of the discrepancy be-
tween Alice and Bos’s bits
ω the components (Rzz, Rzx, Rxz, Rxx, tz, tx) of the
Stokes parameterization
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τ the components (Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Ryy, ty) of the
Stokes parameterization
Ω the range of ω
Pc(ω) the set of all Choi operator for a fixed ω
γ the components (Rzz, Rxx, Ryy) of the Stokes pa-
rameterization
κ the components (Rzx,Rzy,Rxz,Rxy,Ryz,Ryx,tz,tx,ty)
of the Stokes parameterization
Γ the range of γ
Pc(γ) the set of all Choi operator for a fixed γ
υ the components (Rzz, Rxx) of the Stokes parameter-
ization
ς the components (Rzx,Rzy,Rxz,Rxy,Ryz,Ryx,Ryy,tz,tx,ty)
of the Stokes parameterization
Υ the range of υ
Pc(υ) the set of all Choi operators for a fixed υ
Notations first appeared in Chapter 4
ξ the function ξ : F22 → F2 such that ξ(a1, a2) =
a1 + a2
ζ the function ζ : F22 → F2 such that ζ(a, 0) = a and
ζ(a, 1) = 0
χA, χB arbitrary functions from F
2
2 to F2
ζA the function F
3
2 → F2 such that ζA(a1, a2, a3) = a1
for χA(a2, a3) = 0 and ζA(a1, a2, a3) = 0 for else
ζB the function F
3
2 → F2 such that ζB(a1, a2, a3) = a1
for χB(a2, a3) = 0 and ζB(a1, a2, a3) = 0 for else
U1 the random variable defined as U1 = ξ(X1,X2)
V1 the random variable defined as V1 = ξ(Y1, Y2)
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W1 the random variable defined as W1 = U1 + V1
U2 the random variable defined as U2 = ζ(X2,W1) or
the random variable defined as U2 = ζA(X2, U1, V1)
V2 the random variable defined as V2 = ζ(Y2,W1 or
the random variable defined as V2 = ζB(X2, U1, V1)
|ψ(k, l)〉 Bell states
PKL the distribution such that the Bell diagonal com-
ponents of a Bell diagonal state
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